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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR & THE "KINDER, GENTLER ARMY"

BY

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ABSTRACT

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As the name implies, this paper addresses the impact, on the Code of the American Warrior, of accusations that today's "Kinder, Gentler Army" is incapable of winning wars. The paper seeks to determine whether the American soldier's professional ethic should change as America's Army enters the 21st Century. Criticisms regarding a degradation of the American warrior ethic are examined in two broad categories: as a result of societal pressures, primarily the integration of women into the Army, and as a result of increased participation in military operations short of war. The study describes the evolution of the warrior code, and while there is no official code of the American warrior, establishes what that code essentially is. The paper reviews past warrior codes in an effort to apply lessons learned by other societies. After deriving what some might call an idealistic warrior ethic, the paper seeks to determine whether the average soldier is capable of living up to it. The research project's conclusion is that the current Code of the American Warrior is "about right," but could be slightly improved for operations short of war by incorporating lessons from the Chinese warriors of the Tao Te Ching and American law enforcement agencies.

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THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR & THE "KINDER, GENTLER ARMY"

INTRODUCTION

Greater love hath no man than this, That a man lay down his life for his friends.

- The Bible, John 15:13

Of the ninety-nine posthumous Medals of Honor awarded in Vietnam, fifty-four were to soldiers who had thrown themselves on grenades or explosives to save the lives of their fellow soldiers. At the core of their being, soldiers fight not for themselves but for others — in the most brutal conflicts where their sense of "what's right" has been betrayed, it may be for no more than their squad mates, but it is not primarily for self. Consideration of others is what motivates soldiers risk their lives for their fellow soldier.

Throughout history, the combination of external threats and high ideals have challenged societies to develop warriors who defend the nation while striving to represent all that is best in their societies. Each society seeks to develop warriors whose code of conduct reflects the values of the nation they serve. The dilemma all societies face, to one degree or another, is how to unleash the fierceness and violence latent in all people without corrupting the societies' values or even endangering the existence of the society and its government. It is this dilemma that early on led to development of a code of the warrior.

Today, the United States stands accused in many corners of getting the relationship between upholding our democratic values out of balance with the capability to unleash controlled violence in the nation's interest. Critics point to a Kinder, Gentler Army they think is unprepared to meet the nation's 21st Century demands. The critics argue that social issues, primarily integration of women into the Army, reliance on technology, and increased emphasis on operations other than war are degrading the warrior spirit and ability of the soldier to fight. One thing these critics seem to fail to understand is that the Code of the Warrior, as it has evolved through history, has less to do with unleashing the violence and passions of war than it does with restraining, controlling, concentrating, and focusing those passions.

This paper seeks to identify what the Code of the American Warrior is, and the extent to which the values, ethics, and the code itself must change to accommodate change in America and America's Army. It concludes that the values upon which the American soldiers' warrior code is based are most appropriate for a democratic republic. The paper concludes the essence of the warrior code, or more properly the soldiers' professional ethic, is about right but

that American soldiers may be at risk in America's next "first battle." Minor adjustments to current training could guard against a warrior spirit that results in an inappropriate inability, hesitancy or reluctance to apply force in circumstances where it is necessary, ethical, legal, and would reduce suffering in the long term.

To support this thesis, the paper will begin by defining key terms that are often used differently and interchangeably by various authors. It will then briefly examine some fundamental principles of the warrior code in general, and the American warrior code or professional ethic in particular. The paper will then examine how the American soldier's professional ethic is impacted by what many call the Kinder, Gentler Army.

Sections three and four are the paper's main effort. Section three seeks to determine whether the code should be adjusted based on social influences on the Army, primarily the integration of women into the military. This section will draw lessons from past warrior codes that place a premium on chivalry. Section four will examine the evolving role of America's Army with respect to operations short of war and whether the warrior code is appropriate for contingencies such as peace operations. This section will draw lessons from the Chinese warrior monks of the Tao Te Ching. It will also examine what can be learned from the training of law enforcement officers, not to turn American soldiers into policemen, but to determine if any aspects of the police officer's "code of conduct" might help soldiers in operations short of war.

The conclusion is that respect for the enemy is an essential component to the character of the American soldier that will allow him to conduct himself ethically under the strains of battle. The paper concludes that restraint and application of minimal essential force has always been a guiding principle of the American soldier in war, but that it is in operations other than war that it is most difficult to determine how much restraint is appropriate. It is totally appropriate for the soldier, in both war and operations short of war, to adjust his application of force based on the enemy's resistance. The problem with such theory is the difficulty of the average person's putting it into practice. Many argue that it is the rare and exceptional person who can transition from war to operations short of it and strike the proper balance between applying the right amount of force to accomplish the mission while taking care of people and respecting the enemy. Section five will examine this issue — whether an idealistic code is feasible. The final section draws conclusions and makes some recommendations.

SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING THE TERMS

.... A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war. As Aristotle taught, character is a habit, the daily choice of right and wrong. It is a moral quality that grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed in war. The conflict between morality and necessity is eternal. But at the end of the day the soldier's moral dilemma is only resolved if he remains true to himself.

- Lieutenant General Sir James Glover²

There is no official American Code of the Warrior. Furthermore, various authors and experts writing about the Code of the Warrior use a variety of terms interchangeably. Terms such as Warrior Code, Warrior Spirit, Warrior Ethic, Professional Ethic, Character, Morals, Values, Leader Attributes, and Law of War are all central to how the American soldier conducts himself in battle. The first thing that needs to be done is to put these terms in perspective and to show their relationship to each other before assessing the Code of the American Warrior.

The Code of the Warrior is deeply rooted in the Values of the society and army the warrior serves. Values are principles and qualities deemed valuable or desirable. The things people value are the things they will expend effort or resources to defend or obtain. Some of the universal warrior values that will be examined in more detail later include loyalty, courage, and integrity. In addition to values the warriors of all nations share, each society strives to instill unique national values into its soldiers. For American soldiers, the national values embodied in the Constitution of the United States are ultimately what is being defended in combat. The American soldier is sworn to defend the Constitution of the United States. The soldiers of other nations take different oaths that reflect the values, or past values, of their societies. For example, the British soldier is sworn to defend the crown; the Russian soldier traditionally defended the homeland, earth or Mother Russia; the soldiers of the former Soviet Union were sworn to defend the party and the state; the French Foreign Legion takes an oath to the Legion.

FM 22-100, Army Leadership, notes that values tell only part of what a leader must be, that certain leader attributes or characteristics are also necessary.³ Attributes are a person's fundamental qualities and characteristics. Examples of personal attributes desired by warriors throughout history include: will to succeed, self-discipline, and physical fitness; these too will be looked at more closely in a subsequent section. FM 22-100 informs us that personal values and attributes are the two components to a person's character.⁴ With respect to this paper's thesis, the difference between values and attributes is not particularly important, but our doctrine makes a distinction and this paper respects that distinction. With respect to the paper's thesis, character is what is most important. Character, shaped by values and attributes, guides the

soldier's conduct. On the battlefield, the character of the individual soldier is the key to an Army's ability to fight with aggressiveness in accordance with its values, while living up to the theory of combat ethics.

The character of her individual soldiers, and particularly her warrior leaders, is the key to solving the nation's dilemma in war: how to apply force and focus violence to achieve a noble end without compromising the nation's values and the moral imperative for action. Character is the inner strength and commitment that inspires a soldier to do the right thing, regardless of situation. As former Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickam noted in his 1986 White Paper on Army Values...

Our character is what enables us to withstand the rigors of combat or the challenges of daily life that might tempt us to compromise our principles such as integrity, loyalty, or selflessness. Ultimately, strengthening the values that make up our character enables us to strengthen our inner self, strengthen our bonding to others, and strengthen our commitment to a higher calling.⁵

A critical aspect of our character is that it is exposed for all to see by our behavior. A problem for the soldier in combat, whose character is put under the greatest possible strain, is that character alone may not properly prepare him for all the moral dilemmas he may face. As FM 22-100 notes, "character is important in living a consistent and moral life, but character doesn't always provide the final answer to the specific question, What should I do now?" The answer to that question requires ethical reasoning, reinforced by the collected wisdom of those who went before us.

There is no clear process, or precise checklist, to tell the soldier-leader how to balance mission accomplishment, with the care of his soldiers, and the proper consideration for the rights of his enemies and civilians on the battlefield. Yet, throughout history as nations called upon soldiers to defend national interests in battle, binding customs evolved to limit killing and the destruction of property. Not only can these customs and unwritten laws help guide action in times of conflict, they also serve to shape character in times of peace. Different for each society, these customs essentially form the warrior ethic for the nation's army and the code of the warrior for her individual soldiers. The paper will next define the warrior ethic, code, spirit and ethos.

Paraphrasing the American Heritage Dictionary, the warrior ethic for a particular nation can be said to be the body of principles of right or good conduct; in other words, moral customs.⁷ Translated to the individual warrior, the nation's warrior ethic becomes the individual's code of conduct, or Code of the Warrior. Similarly, there is a parallel between that nation's warrior ethos, and the spirit of the individual warrior. The warrior ethos of a nation can

be said to be the disposition, character, or attitude peculiar to a specific people's warriors; or the fundamental values or spirit, mores. Essentially, the warrior ethos for an Army collectively translates into the warrior spirit of its individual soldiers, and that is how this paper will relate the terms.

There is a similar distinction between ethics and morals. While a thesaurus will show ethics and morality to be synonyms, they are different in common usage. Ethics usually refers to principles, rules or standards of behavior for an organization, nation, or profession. They are standards of conduct with respect to values. Morals usually refer to individual rules or standards of conduct. That is how they will be used in this paper. In many nations, including the United States, the warrior ethic and morals embedded in the warrior code are further refined by professionalism.

COLLECTIVE TERMS	INDIVIDUAL TERMS
Values	Values
Warrior Ethic	Code of the Warrior
Professional Ethic	
Warrior Ethos	Warrior Spirit
Ethics	Morais
N/A	Attributes
	Character

TABLE 1 (COLLECTIVE & INDIVIDUAL TERMS)

FM 22-100 states that the warrior ethos refers to the *professional* attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American soldier.¹⁰ The American warrior's ethic then is a professional ethic – a set of rules and standards governing all members of the American profession of arms. In his book *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington identifies three distinguishing characteristics of a profession: expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Expertise relates to satisfaction of a social need. Corporateness means the profession adheres to its own criterion of competence and controls admission to its ranks. Responsibility means that the expertise of the profession is deemed critical or necessary by the society. The profession is expected to recognize a special commitment and a special obligation to society.¹¹

The professional ethic facilitates and enables the soldier's service to society. Again, the warrior code evolved to protect societies against abuse or excess by the warrior. In his book

Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, Anthony Hartle notes that professional ethics also delineate the moral authority for actions necessary to the professional function, but generally impermissible in moral terms. ¹² The professional soldier's ethic then not only serves to guide and restrain the action of soldiers in combat, but in some instances it can also help legitimize the soldier's action. While the professional ethic serves to help legitimize what might otherwise be considered immoral acts, it is important to note that the professional ethic also requires adherence to the various laws, treaties, and conventions regulating the conduct of war to which the United States is a party.

The law of war is also intended to both legitimize and limit the violence and use of force in combat so as to minimize death and destruction. The written laws codify and reinforce the customary or unwritten laws. The aim of the law of war is to allow the soldiers to accomplish their mission without causing unnecessary suffering or destruction of property, and to provide humane treatment for all persons not involved in, or removed from the fight. The laws of war are legally binding, which can put the soldier in a difficult position. For example, regarding the question of whether obedience to orders is a valid defense, Lieutenant General Glover writes:

The nub of the soldier's problem is not the existence of the law itself but rather whether "a moral choice [is] in fact open to him." Yet his duty demands that he obey orders instantly without hesitation. Any legal encouragement to disobey strikes at the very roots of military discipline. But in the heat of battle, whether the enemy be a Russian, an Argentinian, or even an IRA terrorist, things are necessarily done which later, in the frigidity of a law court, may seem outrageous – for war is a rough game. ¹³

For the warrior, the law of war can be a two edged sword. The written law serves to both legitimize the warrior and hold him accountable. Yet, it is the human aspect of warfare that puts the soldier and his personal code to an extraordinary test in combat and human nature cannot be neatly quantified into a set of universal laws. The fact that soldiers react differently – the adversity that strengthens the resolve of one soldier may break another – underscores the importance of character in combat. The warrior's professional ethic needs to both guide action in battle and develop the soldier's character in peacetime to enable service in combat. Having clarified and defined key terms, the paper is prepared to take a closer look at what is meant by the Code of the Warrior generally, and what it means to the American soldier specifically.

SECTION 2: THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR

In peace there's nothing so becomes a man as modest stillness and humility; but when the blast of war blows in our ears then imitate the action of the tiger; stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, disguise thy fair nature with hard found rage; then lend the eye a terrible aspect let it pry through the portage of the head like the brass cannon; let the brow o'erwhelm it as fearfully as doth a galled rock o'erhang and jutty his confounded base. Swilled with the wild and fretful ocean. Now set the teeth and stretch the nostril wide. Hold hard the breath and bend up every spirit to his full height! On you noblest English! Whose blood is fet from fathers of war proof; fathers that like so many Alexanders have in these parts from morn till even fought and sheathed their swords for lack of argument.

- King Henry V, Act III, Scene I

The warrior figure transcends time and place. In one manifestation or another, the warrior has been an essential element in societies throughout history and on all parts of the globe. An essential servant, the true warrior did not fight out of a love for aggression, but out of a caring for others. The purpose of the warrior was and is to protect others – his family, friends, fellow soldiers, and nation. Selflessness is the ultimate source of the warrior's will and courage. The paradox for both society and the warrior himself is that uncontrolled, the aggressiveness and combativeness required of the warrior, both individually and collectively, is a threat not only to his enemies, but friends alike. A long-standing challenge for societies has been to channel, regulate, and direct the collective aggression and force the warrior uses to protect society so that the same force does not destroy the society. To accomplish this need, warriors have usually been bound by a code of conduct, which in many nations is more accurately described as a way of life. This section will examine the roots of the warrior code and attempt to determine what it is for the American soldier today.

THE BERSERKR

Odin could bring it about that in battle his enemies were struck with blindness, deafness, or terror, so that their weapons cut no better than sticks; whereas his own men refused to wear mail coats and fought like mad dogs or wolves, biting their shield rims; they had the strength of bears or bulls. They cut down the enemy, while neither fire nor iron could make an impression on them.

- Ynglinga Saga (about Vikings inspired by Odin's berserk rage)¹⁴

In his book *Code of the Warrior*, Rick Fields traces the roots of the warrior's code back to the early Indo-European warriors who first emerged about 5,000 BC, and who were well

established by time of Homer's epic poems, 1250-1200 B.C. With little or no restraint on their activities, these marauding warriors would more likely be considered outlaw bands today. With horse mounted mobility, they ravaged the land and plundered cities. There was little or no restraint on the Indo-European's conduct, and they not only terrorized their victims, but their uncontrolled violence was a risk to their own people and indeed themselves. Practically speaking, there was no code of conduct for these "warriors." With some remarkable exceptions (Rome and Greece for example), the ethos, or lack thereof, of these early warriors was pretty much universal from the beginning of man through the time of the Dark Ages.

The typical Indo-European warrior would lose control of himself in battle, working himself into a frenzy of destruction. Fields quotes Mircea Eliade.

The essential part of the military initiation consisted in ritually transforming the young warrior into some species of predatory wild animal. It was not only a matter of courage, physical strength, and endurance, but of a magico-religious experience that radically changed the young warrior's mode of being. He had to transmute his humanity by an access of aggressive and terrifying fury that made him a raging carnivore.¹⁵

This raging warrior has come to be referred to as the *berserkr* and is perhaps best typified by the Viking warrior that gave him the name. The term berserk comes from either "bare skin" or "bear skin," referring to the *berserkr's* habit of fighting without armor – either bare chested or in animal skins. The truth regarding these warriors is obfuscated by the legend. Not all Vikings were *berserkrs*, although some authors use the terms interchangeably. The Vikings considered the *berserkrs* as elite forces. Many historians think hallucagenic mushrooms indigenous to that part of the world could have induced the psychopathic courage mixed with madness with which they seemed possessed. What is clear is that the Vikings fielded warriors in battle who incited themselves into a blind fury and their resulting bloodlust overcame the pain of their wounds.

Jonathan Shay, a leading psychiatrist who specializes in the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) of Vietnam veterans, correlates the fury of the *berserkr* to a part of the human psyche resident in all of us. In his book, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, Shay writes, "A soldier who routes an enemy single-handedly is often in the grip of a special state of mind, body and social disconnection at the time of his memorable deeds. Such men, often regarded by their commanders as 'the best,' have been honored as heroes." Shay concludes that "berserk" is indeed the most precise term to describe the behavior of a man in this state of mind. To support his assertion, Shay relates some of the countless interviews he has done with Vietnam veterans. These examples are reinforced by a story

related to the author by an acquaintance who experienced a similar sort of rage in Vietnam shortly after the death of a friend. This soldier set aside his rifle to climb down into a creek bed and kill an enemy soldier with his knife, continuing to cut the dead body until restrained by his platoon mates. Shay notes that a Marine veteran in his PTSD program received a "high decoration for individual valor" but had no memory of the incident.¹⁸

Dr. Shay identifies several characteristics of the berserk state of mind he has seen in Vietnam veterans that correlate very closely with accounts describing the Viking *berserkr*. He observes that the soldier in a berserk state thinks himself invincible and "feels like a god," the same as the *berserkr* in the Viking sagas. Shay notes that the berserk soldier loses all restraint on his actions so that "the cognitive universe is simplified to a single focus. The berserker is figuratively – sometimes literally – blind to everything but his destructive aim. He cannot see the distinction between civilian and combatant or even the distinction between comrade and enemy." Writing about the Indo-European *berserkr*, Fields relates several ancient accounts of warriors killing friends and loved ones. Finally, Shay notes that once a man goes berserk the first time, he will probably do it again and again. He quotes a Kipling observation from WWI that extends the observation to the post-combat peace, "You went Berserk... you'll probably be liable to fits of it all your life." The tendency to repeatedly slip into a battle frenzy having once been there supports the tales of the *berserkr* who fought that way time and again. The immediate problem for society was how to contain such blind fury while still unleashing the violence required to win wars.

The development of the Code of the Warrior, although unique to each society in its time and place, was a result of the need for society to protect itself from the excesses of the *berserkr*. The code was clearly not needed to release a warrior spirit that was running rampant over most parts of the world, as today's pundits imply. On the contrary, the problem was how to control the violence of the warrior so that the power that protected the state and won its wars did not destroy that state. This dilemma remains to this day and is at the heart of the current debate about a Kinder, Gentler Army. One of the early codes, pre-dating the Vikings is that of the Heroic Warrior of ancient Greece. But before continuing, it is appropriate to identify some of the *berserkr*'s time-tested warrior values that remain central to American soldiers' warrior ethos of today.

In the epic poem *The Battle of Maldun*, an aged warrior comments, "Heart must be braver, courage the bolder, mind the firmer, as our strength becomes lesser. Here lies our lord. A noble man, in blood and mud. Those who turn their back now will regret it forever. I am old. I will not leave here, I will lie beside my lord – the man I love most dearly." Here in the *berserkr*

we see such timeless and noble values as loyalty, courage, will, integrity, and selflessness. The aged warrior demonstrates the special bond between soldiers who have fought together. The berserkr's drive also illustrates another soldier quality valued throughout the ages, and one that receives less attention than the other values – determination not to fail. The Greek warrior valued these qualities, but there was also an attempt on the part of the heroic warrior to control himself, apply restraint and to "do the right thing."

THE HEROIC WARRIOR

Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, That here, obedient to their laws we lie.

- Epitaph on the tomb of the Spartan dead at Thermopylae

The ethos of the Greek warrior, anchored in the ethics of the Greek philosophers, still influences our Army values and ethics. It also illustrates the fragility and limitations of any warrior code. In the *Iliad*, Achilles, the demi-god and most noble of warriors, fails to meet the standard of the ideal heroic warrior. His example is often referred to when studying the warrior code and spirit. It is all the more important to the American soldier since the central tenet of the Code of the Heroic Warrior was respect for others, to include the enemy. Many critics of the Kinder Gentler Army seem to take issue with the Army's recent emphasis on dignity, respect, and consideration for others without understanding the importance of respect to the warrior code.

The heroic warrior engaged in a heroic search for honor in battle, either collectively as part of the Army or in individual combat. He strove to be the best at what he did and a competitive nature was an essential warrior attribute of the time. In the Bronze Age's hand to hand combat, physical prowess was another critical attribute. Combined with the time-tested warrior qualities of the *berserkr*, these attributes helped shape the warrior ethos.

Respect for others, particularly the enemy was also required in order to have a worthy opponent. As Rick Fields notes in *The Code of the Warrior*, there can be no "best" and no heroes without a worthy opponent to defeat. The hero's life was dedicated to winning "first prize" and was a continuous strife for supremacy over his peers.²³ Ultimately, supremacy was determined in combat.

Success in combat, not power, plunder, or wealth was the measure of the heroic warrior. Homer relates Diomedes addressing Glaukus, "I have never seen you before out here on the fields of glory." The words are reminiscent of comments by modern warriors, most notable to

the author in the special operations community, whose opinion of a fellow soldier seems largely based on "seeing him in action."

Battles assumed an aspect of large contests when fought collectively, and of duels when fought individually. There were rules to be obeyed. Fields relates some of the formality of individual combat, "The duel began with a recitation of each warrior's lineage, both as a boast and as a confirmation that the participants were indeed members of the same warrior aristocracy. Having established the fact that they were worthy opponents, they moved in." The personal code was thus based on respect for an enemy and the hero's sense of honor extended beyond himself as well.

The Athenian oath (Appendix 1) speaks to values that remain essential to the America's military ethos today. In addition to the noble qualities of the *berserkr*, they include duty, service to country, and respect for the rule of law. Some Greek warrior values are common to soldiers of all ages; others are somewhat unique to a democracy. All relate to something greater than self and are rooted in protecting and defending others.

By the time of Aristotle and Alexander, centuries after Achilles, the face of war had changed somewhat. However, as John Keegan notes in *The Mask of Command*, the spirit and character of Homer's charioteer and Alexander's cavalryman were essentially the same:

But in approach to life and cast of mind they were beings of the same blood, men whose worth in their own eyes and those of their equals was determined by disregard for danger and contempt for the future. To do the right thing in the present moment, and to suffer the consequences as they might be, was the code by which the Companions lived.²⁶

As Alexander's teacher, Aristotle and his ethic of the virtuous life and the mandate to live well had a great impact on Alexander and his Macedonian army. Alexander's respect for a valiant foe is well documented and the lessons he taught in this regard were not forgotten by the great leaders of the 20th Century such as Douglas MacArthur who reflected on them as he oversaw the occupation of Japan.

Alexander the Great's treatment of the people he conquered was usually magnanimous. After the battle of Granicus he forbade plunder. He forbade inquisition and revenge, realizing that innocent lives would be taken in his name. He required tribute to be paid at the same rates as it had under the king (Darius) he conquered. He instituted his famous practice of local governance, leaving a local chieftain in charge of an area with a Greek representative in a sort of liaison capacity.²⁷ After the battle of Hydaspes, Alexander's treatment of King Poros is legendary. After the most difficult battle of his career, when the vanquished opponent was brought to him, Alexander asked Poros what he desired be done with him. Poros replied, "Treat

me, Alexander, like a king." Alexander immediately restored his authority, increased the size of his territory, and assumed there would be future friendship between the two of them. As a conqueror, he generously governed. J.F.C. Fuller writes,

Though at times Alexander could be over-brutal to his enemies, he never fell into the error of holding them in contempt. He accepted that as human beings, though they varied in culture, they were endowed with the same virtues and vices to be found in his Greeks and Macedonians, and that anything more than transient success demanded this acknowledgement. Although he cannot have failed to realize that the machiavellian maneuvers so skillfully resorted to by his father could pay high dividends, he also must have understood that they were insecure capital investments, because they left the impression on the enemy's mind that he had been cheated out of victory by a trickster; that his opponent was morally inferior to himself. Similarly, after Chaeronea, his own reception by the Athenians must have made an indelible impression on him, and on this occasion he could not have failed to appreciate that his father's generous behavior toward Athens achieved incomparably more than ruthlessness or craft.²⁹

This ability to seize and hold the moral high ground not only had pragmatic effects that allowed him to keep the empire from falling apart, but also matched deeds to the words of the heroic warriors ethos and oath. Against the trend of his times, and indeed the times for centuries to come, Alexander often demonstrated compassion. Informed observers have noted that the judgement and character he showed in dealing with conquered peoples had as much or more to do with his tremendous reputation at the time than his battlefield successes.

Alexander was far from perfect. His excesses of alcohol and violence are legendary as well. It seems probable that his killing of his friend Cleitus is another example of a raging warrior being a danger to his comrades as well as the enemy. His behavior highlights the fact that even the greatest warriors can succumb to the worst rage of the *berserkr* despite a code of conduct. Achilles even better illustrates the frailties of man.

Perhaps the best reason to study the heroic warrior for purposes of determining a fitting warrior code for an American soldier entering the 21st Century is that he demonstrates the fragility of any such code when the character of a warrior is subjected to the extreme stresses of combat. Perhaps no better example exists in history or literature than Alexander's personal hero and the warrior often represented as the Western World's ideal warrior – Achilles.

Even with the heroic ideals and exemplary character that guided him, Achilles was vulnerable, like any human, to the blind fury of the *berserkr*. With the death of his friend Patrocles, Achilles enters a frenzy of bloodlust. Homer relates that he cut a wide swath of death. He ran down those enemy trying to flee and granted no quarter, not even to those who flung their arms around his knees begging for mercy. The *lliad* says, "As through deep glens rageth fire on some parched mountainside... so raged he every way with his spear, as it had

been a god, pressing hard on the men he slew, and the black earth ran with blood."³⁰ Achilles meets with Hector and kills him. Then, in his most damning act, refuses to honor Hector's dying wish to have his body returned to the Trojans with an oath, "You dog! I wish my stomach would let me cut off your flesh in strips and eat it raw for what you have done to me"³¹ Lashing the corpse to his chariot, he drags Hector's naked body around the walls of Troy and Patrocles' funeral pyre; this continues for days. Even Achilles, the greatest and noblest of all warriors could be turned into a beast. Fields writes, "In his rage, he had violated the most sacred tenet of the heroic warrior's code: that the worthy opponent must be treated with respect in death as well as life."³² It is not at all ironic that Achilles achieves redemption by finally returning Hector's body to Priam, Hector's father and king of Troy. Like scenes repeated throughout history, as Achilles releases his rage it is replaced by sorrow, his emotions break, and Homer relates that "Achilles wept... and their moan went up throughout the house."³³

In treating the PTSD of Vietnam veterans, Jonathan Shay is well acquainted with the emotional swings of the warrior. His book, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, is intended to relate Achilles and other heroes of the Iliad with the human experience in combat.³⁴ He makes a compelling case that it is after the soldiers' concept of "what's right" is betrayed, that the serious spiritual, moral, and disciplinary breakdowns that ultimately destroy men, units, armies and even nations occur. His personal experience is that moral injury is essential to long-term combat trauma and that veterans could usually recover from horror, fear, and grief so long as their sense of "what's right" had not been violated. He writes that the soldiers' reactions to betrayal of "what's right" is unchanged across three millennia. The first reaction is indignant rage against the betrayal and those who perpetrated it, which then opens the way for berserk rage.³⁵ The Vietnam veterans' betrayal was complex and varied, but might be summed up as resulting from a high level leadership, out of touch with the realities of the war. A common manifestation of this betrayal was an inability of leadership to articulate an ethical need for actions that, at least on the surface, seemed to run counter to their American values - such as burning down an unoccupied Montagnard village, whose neutral inhabitants had fled in fear. Achilles betrayal was much more direct. It was the unjust seizure of a prize of honor (the captive woman Briseis) that was rightfully his. His suppressed rage had been simmering; the death of Patrocles was the immediate trigger for its release.

Whether in 1200 B.C. or 2001, when the soldier's sense of "what's right" is violated he becomes confused and angry. He begins to question his own values and is no longer confident about "what's right." Without a moral base for action, and in the crucible of combat, the

inclination is toward rage. The lesson for military leadership of a democratic nation, both civilian and military, is not to allow a betrayal of the soldier's sense of "what's right."

The lesson of the heroic warrior is that from the bottom up and the top down the relationship of the terms we defined in section one must be mutually supporting, consistent, and most importantly manifested in action. Any inconsistency from the collective ethos to the soldier's personal code, from the nation's collective values to the soldiers individual spirit is likely to result in a betrayal of what the individual soldier "thinks right." When that betrayal takes place, not only the individual, but also the mission is at risk. The tight linkage vertically and horizontally is particularly important since the values, ethos, code, morals, and ethics serve to shape the soldiers character in peacetime as much as they guide his actions in war. Just as repetitive battle drills create habits that stand up under the strains of combat, it is also important to train character in peace so that it will be ready for the rigors of war. With that in mind, the professional ethic of the American soldier will be examined next.

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER'S PROFESSIONAL ETHIC

War must be carried out systematically, and to do it you must have men of character activated by principles of honor.

- George Washington³⁶

The foundation of the American soldier's warrior ethic consists of the best qualities of those codes examined thus far. Traits such as loyalty, duty, courage, discipline, stamina, integrity, selflessness, and competence are valued as much today as they ever have been. Aggression, daring, and initiative are other enduring values. Time-tested attributes such as physical fitness, will, discipline, initiative, and judgement remain highly valued today and contribute to the character that the U.S. Army tries to instill in its soldiers. In 1986, The Year of Army Values, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh and Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickam, Jr. called these Tier 1 Values, or values common to all soldiers in any era, in any army, in any country.³⁷

Secretary Marsh and General Wickam also identified what they called Tier 2 Values. These values are special to the United States soldier. They begin with the Judeo-Christian heritage, to include the Greek philosophers who influenced the heroic warrior's ethos. Secretary Marsh includes the Ten Commandments (Appendix 2) and the Golden Rule. The long history of democracy has shaped American values, beginning with the Greek democracies and including the Magna Carta (1215) and English Bill of Rights (1688). Values particularly

special to the United States are embodied the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights. These latter documents highly value the individual and clearly stake out America's commitment to dignity and freedom.

There are some additional values that do not attract as much attention but are part of the American warrior ethos as well. One of these is civilian control of the military, spelled out in our Constitution and a point of particular pride within the military and government. Closely related to both civilian control, and the added responsibilities of professionalism, is recognition on the part of the officer corps of the privilege and obligation it is to be an American officer. Regarding the special trust and confidence America has bestowed on her officers, S.L.A. Marshall writes,

Having been specially chosen by the United States to sustain the dignity and integrity of its sovereign power, an officer is expected to maintain himself, and so to exert his influence for so long as he may live, that he will be recognized as a worthy symbol of all that is best in the national character. In this sense the trust imposed in the highest military commander is not more than what is enjoined upon the newest ensign or second lieutenant. Nor is it less. It is the fact of commission that gives special distinction to the man and in return requires that the measure of his devotion to service of his country be distinctive, as compared with the charge laid upon the average citizen.³⁸

A humble and sincere recognition by an officer of the special trust and confidence placed in him cannot help but inspire in a soldier of character an intense desire not to let the nation down. An understanding that his position is a privilege and not a right can serve as a reminder that the individual is part of a larger Army and that occasionally the interests of the individual must be sacrificed for the greater good of the Army and nation. In this sense, it serves as a reminder that life is not fair. A commander who is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do will sometimes have to bear the burden of that responsibility even though he may not have fully been personally culpable in some act that requires retribution.

Finally, compassion has always been considered an essential aspect of the American soldier's character. It is not included in FM 22-100 and it is not usually mentioned. This warrior attribute translates the value of dignity and respect into action. FM 100-1 makes the point that American soldiers have shown their compassionate nature in every endeavor in peace and war, in caring for noncombatants and prisoners of war as quickly as the situation permits.³⁹ As the magnanimity of Alexander the Great demonstrated, for the warrior of prowess, compassion contains the secret of greatness. As is so often the case, Shakespeare said it best. Regarding the synergistic mix of compassion and power, he wrote Portia's plea for mercy (Merchant of Venice),

The quality of mercy is not strain'd,

It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes; 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes The throned monarch better than his crown; His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, The attribute to awe and majesty. Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; But mercy is above this sceptred sway; It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, It is an attribute of God himself; And earthly power doth then show likest God's When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew, Though justice be thy plea, consider this, That in the course of justice, none of us Should see salvation: we do plea for mercy; And that same prayer doth teach us all to render The deeds of mercy.⁴⁰

There is no better example of the American soldier's compassion, enabled by power, than the father of our country, George Washington. One example of Washington's compassion occurred in January 1777 when, during the Battle of Princeton, Washington rode past an American soldier trying to rob a wounded British soldier. Washington drove the thief off and placed a guard on the British Redcoat until he could be moved. Reflecting on Washington's character, French staff officer Barbe-Marbois wrote, "I have been told that he [Washington] preserves in battle the character of humanity which makes him so dear to his soldiers in camp." It is important to deliberately, and in detail, establish the importance of the attribute of compassion to the warrior ethic, since critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army do not seem to acknowledge the quality. Indeed, one might infer from their writings that it is an unworthy warrior attribute. On the contrary, as we have seen, it is an attribute that great soldiers above the level of the *berserkr* strive to possess. It is a critical facet of a faithful warrior.

The values and attributes identified thus far form a uniquely American warrior ethos based on dignity and respect for each human being. While there is no established Code of the American Warrior, these values are consistently repeated, with varying degrees of emphasis depending on the group, throughout the various creeds, oaths, codes that are parts of different Army subcultures. The reader, if he chooses, can compare these himself. FM 22-100 describes the values our Army wants our soldiers to hold dear, and attributes it wishes them to

have (Appendix 3). The Army Values Card, issued in 1998, prescribes a U.S. Army Soldier's Code (Appendix 4). FM 100-1 describes a complementary set of values and professional qualities contained within the Army ethos (Appendix 5) Other creeds include the Ranger Creed (Appendix 6), NCO Creed (Appendix 7), Code of Conduct (Appendix 8), and Special Forces code and values (Appendix 9). Army units have developed their own codes such as that in the 1984 edition of the III Corps Commander's Handbook (Appendix 10). Civilians have also contributed to the American military ethic. In his book *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, Anthony E. Hartle spells out what he thinks is the traditional ethic of the American military (Appendix 11).

The Code of the American Warrior, or more properly, his professional ethic is an amalgam of values and attributes that have evolved over the course of centuries. Values that date back to the *berserkr* include loyalty, courage, selflessness, will and determination to succeed. Attributes from the ancient warriors include aggressiveness, daring, initiative and physical fitness. The Heroic warrior contributed competitiveness, respect, dignity, integrity, and the need to determine a "sense of what's right." Our American heritage has provided the American soldier's sense of duty and combined with religion, primarily the Judeo-Christian heritage, refined the sense of "what's right." The American heritage has also provided professionalism, civilian control of the military, compassion, and the concept that soldiering is a privilege that entails obligations to society. While it is not formally written down, this is essentially the professional ethic of the American soldier. Subsequent sections will identify a characteristic or two of other warrior codes that might further enhance this code.

AMERICA'S NEXT ENEMY: THE 21ST CENTURY BERSERKR

Ultimately, we engage in the confusing and muddled business of war for only one reason — to protect the values of liberty, at the heart of which lies the innate respect for others.⁴²

- Edgar C. Doleman

Before continuing, it is important to revisit the ethos of the *berserkr* and address that warrior in 21st Century terms. This type warrior is more likely to be the American soldier's next adversary than another professional soldier with similar values. This is the warrior that American soldiers fought in Somalia and confronted in the Balkans; it is the warrior who attacked the destroyer USS Cole. In an Army magazine article, William Hawkins quotes John Keegan describing societies in which the young are "brought up to fight, think fighting honorable, and think killing in warfare glorious.... [the warrior] prefers death to dishonor and

kills without pity when he gets the chance."⁴³ This warrior has no respect for others or the values of liberty.

Ralph Peters, a leading authority on modern warfare, makes a sharper distinction between a soldier and a warrior than many authorities who note that by the dictionary definition of a warrior (one engaged or experienced in battle), not all soldiers are warriors. Peters distinguishes the two more by the differences of their ethics or code of conduct in battle. His definitions would align the 21st Century warrior much more closely with the unconstrained berserkr than with the professional soldier who fights in according to an ethic.

In stark contrast to the well disciplined, trained, and equipped professional soldier, there are few controls on Peters' modern day warrior, and if he fights by a code of conduct, it is a loyalty to his band, clan or group alone. In his book *Fighting for the Future*, Peters assesses modern warriors as:

...erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by the rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like. Warriors have always been around, but with the rise of professional soldieries their importance was eclipsed. Now... the warrior is back, as brutal as ever and distinctly better armed.⁴⁴

In a 1994 article for *Parameters*, he lists several traits that illustrate where the values and ethics of the professional soldier and 21st Century warrior diverge. These values are provided in Table 2.

The Soldier	The Warrior
Sacrifice	Spoils
Disciplined	Semi or undisciplined
Organizational orientation	Individualist
Skills focus on defeating other	Skills focus directly on violence
soldiers	·
Allegiance to state	Allegiance to charismatic figure, cause,
	or paymaster
Recognized legal status	Outside the law
"Restorer of Order"	"Destroyer of Order"

TABLE 2 (SOLDIER VS. WARRIOR CHARACTERISTICS)⁴⁵

Many experienced combat veterans, such as Lieutenant General Sir James Glover in a 1983 Parameters article, are firm in their belief that counterinsurgency and operations short of war put the most strain on the soldiers' professional ethic. ⁴⁶ Even more than in conventional war, fighting warriors will put American soldiers into the morally ambiguous and uncertain environment where their sense of "what's right" is most easily betrayed. Not only a solid professional ethic will be required of the soldier, but a strength of character that helps him resist the urge to behave out of immoral motives such as revenge and mere desire inflict pain, suffering or death. Since values are manifested in action, such behavior would corrupt our traditional value system and in those soldiers whose character break, replace them with the most brutal values of the *berserkr*. Our deeds would not match the words describing our values, perhaps putting America in the situation of winning the tactical battles while losing legitimacy, the moral imperative, and thus the strategic war.

Central to the critics accusations that today's Kinder, Gentler Army erodes the warrior spirit seems to be a belief that the American soldier will not fare well when faced with the modern day equivalent of the *berserkr*. While Section Three will make the point much more deliberately, there should be no doubt in the reader's mind that the American soldier will decisively defeat these warrior thugs in combat. The question is not whether Americans will win the tactical battles, although the question could become at what cost – to themselves, the mission, and perhaps the American social fabric. In 1901, on the floor of the House of Commons, Winston Churchill predicted that "the wars of the people will be more terrible than those of the kings."

The paper will now consider the Kinder, Gentler Army and attempt to determine how the American professional soldier ethic might fare against the *berserkr* of the 21st Century. In sequential sections, the paper will study the Kinder Gentler Army with respect to the social changes transforming the military (primarily the alleged affects of women in the military), and with respect to the changing missions our Army has been increasingly asked to do since the end of the Cold War.

SECTION 3: THE KINDER GENTLER ARMY: SOCIAL ISSUES AND THE LESSONS OF CHIVALRY

War makes extremely heavy demands on the soldier's strength and nerves. For this reason make heavy demands on your men in peacetime... The best form of "welfare" for the troops is first-class training.

- Erwin Rommel

There is no clear definition of the Kinder, Gentler Army as it seems to mean different things to different soldiers, authors, and pundits. Furthermore, the vast majority of these pundits seem biased with a political position to make or protect; nearly everybody who uses the term Kinder, Gentler Army is a critic of some sort. The most frequent use of the term comes from those who take issue with what they frequently term "politically correct" changes intended to make the Army more nearly reflect contemporary American society - in President Clinton's words, "a force that looks like America." While homosexual policy and positions presuming an over-reliance on technology to fight a "bloodless war," are sometimes included in discussions about a Kinder, Gentler Army, the focal point of the critics is the integration of women into the military. Critics assert the integration of women has resulted in declining standards, morale, and combat effectiveness. Another large body of criticism comes from those who contend that the recent surge in operations short of war is a factor in the erosion of combat readiness and the warrior spirit. These criticisms will be addressed in the next section. Central to each critic's argument is an assertion that warfighting has been sacrificed in a "politically correct" attempt to make the Army reflect societies attitudes in a way this is detrimental to combat effectiveness. This section will examine charges that feminization of the Army is making it a "gentler" force incapable of winning the nations wars.

The subject of this paper is the Code of the Warrior, not integration of women into the military. This paper seeks to determine if the Army's values, ethos, professional ethic, and most specifically the warrior code, as developed in section two, should change to accommodate changes in American society. This paper will not draw conclusions or make recommendations about policy regarding the integration of women into the Army other than those directly impacting on the warrior code and spirit. This section begins with "boot camp," and how the Army trains, treats and develops character in the young men and women entering the Army today.

LESS STRESSFUL BASIC TRAINING

Some have misinterpreted the fundamental meaning of warriorship to justify uncaring, roughshod treatment of subordinates, shallow showmanship, or poor professional preparation on their own part.⁴⁸

- John Bahnsen & Robert Cone; Parameters

Basic training is a good place to begin our examination of the Kinder, Gentler Army because it is where the Army starts to instill the warrior ethos and professional ethic into our nations youth and transform them into soldiers. It is where the recruit, or young soldier, is first introduced to the Army and where military discipline is first introduced into his life. Critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army usually use what they consider a "gentle" boot camp or "Boot Camp Lite" as an example of erosion in the warrior spirit. They seem to rely on a pre-conceived notion in the American psyche of a harsh, profane environment to drive home their charges. They declare that in the past, Basic Training served as a sort of trial or initiation where new recruits were put under great physical, mental, and emotional stress. The best were broken down before being rebuilt into a stronger soldier, and the unworthy were weeded out. They argue that today we have lowered the standard to such a degree that unworthy recruits become soldiers. These critics further conclude that the less stressful Basic Training experience translates into a less aggressive and less capable soldier - a soldier who does not possess the warrior ethic or spirit necessary to fight and win in combat.

Confusing Abuse with being Tough and Demanding

The discipline which makes to soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite a strong resentment and desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.

- MG John M. Schofield August 11, 1879.

Critics of the gentler basic training usually seem to make a direct relationship between harshness of training and character development. They seemingly subscribe to the belief that recruits must be broken in order to be built back up. In *The Kinder, Gentler Military*, Stephanie

Gutmann implies that at least some degree of abuse is good when she writes, "The sergeant of the nineties, on the other hand, is under strict orders not to 'abuse the recruits." In *Women in the Military*, Brian Mitchell writes, "Drill sergeants still raise their voices, but not as often. They are forbidden to curse, call recruits names, or belittle them in any way... Instead, recruits are treated with dignity and respect." A paragraph later he makes the error in logic so often made by adherents to this school of thought when he says, "Discipline is out; communication is in." Discipline is not about harshness or abuse, although long before Frederick the Great formalized it into a system of discipline, it was one way of achieving it. The American Army has never been one of those nations relying on an Army-wide system that makes the soldier more afraid of his leaders than of the enemy. Such a system would be inconsistent with our national values as embodied in the Constitution, and would not succeed. Rather, the American tradition is to "lead by example" and "follow me." Schofield's definition of discipline was written in 1879. It has been an important article of faith for our Army since then, as demonstrated by the fact it has long been a requirement for West Point cadets to memorize it. It is wrong to think the only way to instill discipline is through abuse.

Critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army also assert that harshness in training is appropriate for the purpose of running weak soldiers out of the Army. Closely related to the technique of breaking a soldier down and then rebuilding him, this practice is similarly flawed. It masks poor leadership and allows junior leaders to avoid responsibility for not making every effort to improve the soldier to reach his or her potential. Certainly some soldiers will always fail to meet training standards, but they deserve the best effort of the drill sergeant to teach them how to meet the standard. The idea that it is acceptable to run soldiers out of the Army who are slower or achieve results a bit differently than their peers confuses the soldier's lack of progress with the leader's poor leadership and lack of teaching ability.

Inspiring leadership combined with adherence to high standards through personal accountability is the American Army's way to instill discipline. The enforcement aspect of this "carrot and stick" approach is a fair, professional, and firm demand to adhere to standards or suffer clear and previously established consequences. A critical aspect of this method of instilling discipline is fair and just enforcement - equal treatment for all. Another critical aspect is to ensure the standards are high and demanding. If harsh treatment is not an appropriate criticism, the maintenance of standards certainly is. Critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army typically charge that there is a problem with standards as a result of the integration of women into the service. While an in-depth examination is beyond the scope of this paper, there is evidence (both anecdotal and statistical) to suggest that a problem faced by today's Army is that

standards are neither as high as they have been in the past, nor the same for both men and women. Gutmann quotes one drill sergeant, "You're not being a soldier, you're being a mamma. Abuse is one thing, being tough and demanding is another." ⁵¹

Dual standards and lower standards

Be strict in your discipline; that is, to require nothing unreasonable of your officers and men, but see that whatever is required be punctually complied with. Reward and punish every man, according to his merit, without partiality or prejudice; hear his complaints; if well founded, redress them; if otherwise, discourage them in order to prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice in every shape, and impress upon the mind of every man, from the first to the lowest, the importance of the cause, and what they are contending for.

- George Washington

It is undeniable that at least some Army standards are different for men and women. One has to look no further than the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) to prove the point. While some feminists have argued that societal custom and norms have created artificial barriers and that, physiologically speaking, there is no reason women cannot be as strong and athletically capable as men, growing scientific consensus indicates this argument is not true.⁵² While critics point to other examples of a dual standard for men and women, they quickly get into gray areas where the political agendas of the proponents for one position or the other tend to obfuscate truth. Regardless of the difficulty of establishing truth, such effort is beyond the scope of this paper and of limited added value. What is important for this paper is that, when confronted with the growing scientific consensus that men and women are physiologically different (what some might consider a "blinding flash of the obvious"), then in the physical world of the warrior, one of two things must logically happen. To include female soldiers in positions requiring the strength and physical prowess of the average to above average man, an Army must either compromise the value of equality by having dual standards, or lower the overall standards so that soldiers of both genders can meet them. With references to Orwellian double-speak, some critics charge the Army with attempting to implement two contradictory policies at the same time. They assert the Army is unwilling to admit there exists a combination of double-standards and lower standards in order to allow women to pass training requirements in roughly the same percentages as men. They charge that this double-speak is one reason for lower morale and decline in the warrior spirit.

The aforementioned Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) is an oft-cited example of doublespeak. Critics note the Army position is that the new test is both fair and universally meets the

Army's needs. Gutmann quotes COL Cellucci, commandant of the Army Physical Fitness School, "the new standards are, overall, tougher for both men and women; we had to establish equity for men and women for all age groups. Now you have equal points for equal effort."53 This statement fails to serve the Army on two counts: the veracity is debatable and even assuming the statement is true, it equates effort with achievement. While the new APFT seem to be more equitable than previous versions, it is doubtful that women get equal points for equal effort as COL Cellucci states. Emerging imperial scientific evidence collected at Natick laboratories appears to counter the notion that the new APFT scoring tables align with the full potential of females to perform better on the test.⁵⁴ But more significantly, even if the new test does achieve equal points for equal effort, this is a relative standard that compares women to men in terms of effort. Only the sit-up category of the APFT establishes standards of equity for men and women in an absolute sense with generally equal points for an equal number of situps. The test does not provide an absolute standard to best prepare a soldier to fight an unforgiving enemy who makes no allowance for physiological differences. Standards that give equal credit for equal effort contribute to a culture and ethos of relative as opposed to absolute standards in a profession that must compete and win in man's most absolute environment - the uncompromising battlefield.

It is possible to adhere to absolute standards while allowing women to serve honorably and capably in their nation's Armed forces, as they have been doing in many specialties for a long time. Based on statistics showing low percentages of women able to meet the strength requirements of their jobs, several studies have recommended gender free strength testing for each specific job specialty.⁵⁵ In the recent past, the Army has come close to implementing physical fitness standards specific to each skill specialty that would retain fairness while having the least impact on overall standards.⁵⁶ It would undoubtedly be a tough political fight, but such proposals would reduce some of the favoritism resident in certain Army standards while bringing the Army's values of fairness into better alignment with policy. Such proposals, if implemented, would help defuse critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army whose criticisms resonate fairly widely across the service. Anecdotal evidence does indicate some frustration in the Army regarding dual standards, and perceptions of unfairness may contribute to morale problems and perhaps an erosion of the warrior spirit. However, the Army is essentially a fair institution as most soldiers seem to intuitively understand. The most damaging charges regard the lowering of standards to allow more soldiers to meet them, thus avoiding the hypocrisy of dual standards.

Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence that there has been fairly widespread lowering of overall standards, at least in part, to accommodate the integration of women. The

basic training requirement to throw a hand grenade thirty-five meters (the bursting radius of the grenade) is one example. It seems clear that it was only after it became apparent the average female recruit had difficulty throwing the grenade that far that the standard changed.⁵⁷ Other basic training standards appear to have been lowered in order to reduce the number of lower extremity injuries that are over twice as likely to occur in women as in men. The frequency of trucking recruits to training events rather than having them roadmarch with a heavy rucksack has increased significantly in recent years.⁵⁸ As with the problem of dual standards, most examples used by the critics lie in gray areas where determining truth can be confusing. Running during daily physical training provides a couple examples.

The Army's change from running in boots to running shoes, while it may or may not have been instituted as a result of stress fractures in women as the critics charge, was a smart thing to do. There is no reason to increase the numbers of injuries, when soldiers can be pushed just has hard physically in running shoes. Critics of conducting physical fitness training in running shoes seem to confuse the ability to endure pain and physical stress with injury. The continued and perhaps increasing emphasis on running in ability groups is an even better example of a gray area where competing views regarding the role of unit physical training can be manipulated by protagonists on both side of the issue.

In theory, ability groups allow the gifted runners to exercise at a faster pace, while the slowest group enforces the unit's minimum standard. Critics of women in the military charge that ability groups are used to allow women to run at a slower pace, and that few units bother to push the slowest groups to improve themselves to the best of their ability. They charge that in many cases the slower groups are ignored and they provide anecdotal stories to support that point of view. Although they may acknowledge the theoretical "goodness" in ability group running, they also think there are limits to the value of ability group running. They view formation running (with runners of all abilities in one formation) as an important part of a physical training program in order to build unit cohesion while setting a minimum standard in terms of running a set distance in a set time. If superior athletes want to improve beyond the unit standard, these leaders believe they can do it primarily on their own time. Critics of ability group running point out that turning an entire formation around to retrieve stragglers leverages peer pressure to both build cohesion and improve future achievement in the runners that fall out.

The author's personal opinion, based on having led infantry units from platoon through battalion level across twenty years of service, is that there is value in both philosophies and a place for both forms of training in a balanced physical fitness program. Today's junior leaders

are much less likely to have considered the cohesion and spiritual benefits of formation running, and it is also true that many units fail to enforce the standards of discipline required to make ability group running as effective as it should be for the slower runners. Better runners thrive in ability groups, as intended. With regard to lower standards as a result of ability group running, the author thinks truth lies somewhere between the two views, but more importantly that it is a leadership responsibility to fix any inconsistencies, regardless of what led to an increased emphasis on ability group running. Regardless of the true impact of ability groups on the Army, continued arguments along these lines contribute to ongoing perceptions that physical training standards have been lowered. With respect to soldier's attitudes, ability groups are a good example of a situation where there is much truth in the cliché that "perception is reality."

Books have been written on both sides of the women in the Army debate. The issue here is not to draw conclusions beyond what is necessary to study the impact on the warrior ethos, spirit, ethic and code. The code of the warrior or the professional ethic has not been affected by the integration of women. So long as the integration of women into the Army or other social issues do not change Army values, the code is not likely to be threatened by social changes.

Having said that, some extreme advocates for expanding the role of women into combat positions have advocated positions that could place the American soldier's professional ethic, as it currently exists, at risk. Madeline Morris, a former consultant to the Department of Defense on gender integration, has called for the elimination of "masculinist" attitudes in the military such as assertiveness, aggressiveness, independence, self-sufficiency, and willingness to take risks. Of course, these time-tested soldier values are essential to the success of any unit in combat and successfully changing the values could not help but change the warrior code. To date, extreme positions such as Ms. Morris' seem to have been kept at the margins of serious debate about the integration of women. The lessons of a warrior code based on Chivalry will be explored in an upcoming section, but Army leadership must remain attentive to single issue advocates of the integration of women into the military whose proposals would have the second order effect of adversely changing the American soldier's code.

This is not to say that women can not be warriors; this paper is not prepared to make a judgement on that issue. Women have fought with men, primarily in guerilla and revolutionary type wars, throughout history. French foreign legionnaires fought female warriors, and suffered casualties as a result of their hesitation to kill, during the 1892 Dahomey expedition for example. Psychologically, women certainly have the capacity to kill and kill in combat; society needs to ask the question "should they?" Each society must judge for itself the role of its women. However, to manipulate truth about the capabilities and limitations of women in order

to achieve a social goal, or to redefine what values are desirable in the warrior places the Army's ability to win wars at risk.

If it is not a degradation of the warrior code the critics decry, they certainly think there has been a softening of the warrior spirit or the capacity for today's soldiers to live up to the code. There is a widespread perception that expanding the integration of women into the Army has contributed to some degree to unequal and lower standards in basic training. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to definitively determine truth regarding the more controversial assertions, at least some of the perception of lower standards is founded in fact. The perception is rooted in something most people intuitively seem to sense, but which has been difficult to prove in a manner to satisfy judges and opposing lobbyists - that women and men are physiologically different and that women are generally not as strong or athletically capable as men. Yet to develop the warrior spirit and enable soldiers in combat, it is of critical importance to maintain the highest possible training standards. A tremendously high level of competence is required to enable any warrior code, and especially one based largely on the values of dignity, respect and compassion.

The only valid reason to keep women out of combat is if their presence detracts from mission accomplishment. Issues such as pregnancy, female hygiene, sexual attraction between men and women, and single parenthood (the vast majority of single parents in the Army are female) would effect to any sort of final decision regarding the role of women in combat. Yet, with regard to training standards and concerns that directly relate to the warrior spirit, the debate usually focuses on physical strength and stamina. Assuming society decides the Army should be as gender neutral as is effectively possible, the fair and simple solution to the possibility that women do not have the physical potential of men is gender neutral testing, a proposal the Army has come close to implementing in the past. One conclusion of this paper is that the Army should implement gender neutral physical fitness testing for all job specialties open to women.

To further develop the connection between competence based on high training standards and an effective warrior code, the next section examines the Army's values and Consideration of Others training.

VALUES TRAINING IN BASIC TRAINING (AND BEYOND)

I found that soldiers' toughness in combat had everything to do with discipline, morale and training and nothing to do with the toughness of their sensibilities. They fought steadfastly and aggressively without having to be inspired with hate or contempt....*⁶¹59

- Edgar C. Doleman Jr.

Another criticism often heard about the Kinder, Gentler Army concerns the sensitivity and Consideration of Others training that was mandated in the wake of multiple scandals across all the services in the 1990s. At best, critics think the training an inappropriate waste of time; at worst, they question whether these are appropriate values for a soldier. The critics seem to think the emphasis on dignity and respect is something new, failing to understand these qualities have been Army values for years. For example, the 1984 Field Manual 27-2, *Your Conduct in Combat* states, "Attacks upon personal dignity or other humiliating or degrading treatment are strictly forbidden by the law of war. It is particularly important to treat every captured or detained female with appropriate respect."

The critics are not merely national level pundits, but Army officers as well. A young captain, indicating the mandate for "political correctness" is the chief cause of declining morale, complains his soldiers are forced to attend classes to make them "sensitive and caring". 63 Based on his comments to national media, the Captain does not think the training important. One can sympathize with the pressures imposed on today's company commanders trying to accomplish a plethora of mandatory training requirements. Yet, the tone of the Captain's message reflects a deeper problem. His use of the emotionally laden terms "political correctness" and "sensitive" as opposed to values such as "respect" and "compassion" indicate he does not see a linkage between these values and the warrior ethic. His reaction seems typical of young soldiers who think the Army leadership is out of touch with what is needed to prepare soldiers for combat.

In an article "Soldiers of Virtue," Karl Zinmeister writes that the most serious question of our day is: How in a soft, often amoral, and self-indulgent age does one transform everyday American boys and girls into strong, principled young men and women?" Writers like Zinmeister note that in today's age of broken homes and "latch key" children, young people tend not to enter adulthood with the same set of values as older generations. More important to this paper is that these young adults may not have some of the values desired in the soldier. In a Strategic Studies Institute monograph, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps*, Dr. Leonard Wong also notes that Generation X officers see values such as loyalty and

selfless service very differently than their predecessors, contributing to their disillusionment with Army life. Both anecdotal evidence such as the quoted Captain and more thoroughly researched authors such as Dr. Wong indicate that the Army is not effectively instilling the warrior values or communicating a linkage between the importance of values and the warrior ethic.

As has always been the case, building effective units with soldiers of character will require some combination of instilling those professional values that the Army deems non-negotiable and modifying the Army's approach toward each succeeding generation. One successful program to build character that will bear fruit on future battlefields, is the West Point Consideration of Others program. Before the Army used it as a model for the Army wide Consideration of Others program, it had earned a particularly high reputation. Speaking of all the military academies, Zinmeister writes, "They provide four years of intense, nearly full-time immersion in the code of the profession." The West Point program provides a foundation for graduating officers to continue to build on throughout their career.

Considering the importance of instilling values in new soldiers, adding a week to basic training to teach American warrior values seems like it should provide a good return on the investment. Initial Entry Training is when new soldiers are at their most impressionable stage of Army development. Additionally, once a soldier arrives in his unit, perceptions of "political correctness" and the pressures of accomplishing an insurmountable number of mandatory training requirements are likely to immerse him in a cynical atmosphere regarding the training. To make values training effective, the Army must guard against soldier and junior leader perceptions that such training is in response to contemporary advocates of social change in the military. Such a perception would likely be the worst thing that could happen with regard to undermining the training necessary to inculcate warrior values. Articulating a direct relationship between values training and the warrior ethic is critical.

A soldier's opportunity to effectively show compassion to his enemies will, in many circumstances, depend on his warfighting competence. Alexander the Great provides a great example. Numerically outnumbered in most of his battles, far from home and surrounded by potential enemies, if it were not for his prowess and achievement, his compassion might have been interpreted as weakness and led to his downfall; perhaps he would not have shown compassion in the first place. Shakespeare's observation that mercy is mightiest in the mighty can be interpreted many ways, not least of which is that the king's power provides him an opportunity to show compassion that a less powerful person would not have. One might conclude that the more competent the warrior is, the easier it is for him to show compassion.

One might also conclude that character development, and thus values training, must be integrated into all of a unit's collective training. Competent and ethical use of lethal force cannot be done without men of character and men of character may not have the opportunity to demonstrate their compassion without competence.

Failure to empower noncommissioned officers and to trust them to instill warrior values while maintaining the highest training standards without abuse is another potential cause of an erosion of the warrior spirit. In her book, The Kinder, Gentler Military, Gutmann relates two particularly disturbing quotes from Army drill sergeants, "We used to be able to push them [recruits] to the limits. It's unheard of now, they call it trainee abuse. As a drill sergeant, you're always having to do a mental check. It changes your spontaneity, and in doing that, it changes the way you think. It's like your protecting your own interests." She quotes another, "Dignity and respect are this big thing now; you hear that over and over again in every address. The problem is, if some private takes you on in front of the platoon, you're going to lose that platoon if you don't lean on him."68 These statements are disturbing because they indicate the drill sergeants do not think they will be supported by the chain of command if they take the steps they think necessary to develop soldiers. There is a difference between verbal abuse and righteous anger. There has to be a place in the Army for righteous anger that may require yelling. There has to be a place in the Army for on the spot punishment such as dropping a soldier for push-ups. The discipline which is the glue that holds an Army together is at risk when noncommissioned officers do not think they have the ability to immediately and decisively confront a soldier who attempts to "take on" his NCO in front of the platoon.

From company commanders to drill sergeants, a plethora of evidence indicates our soldiers do not understand the linkage between dignity, compassion, respect and character to the warrior ethic. They certainly do not perceive much value to the Army's current emphasis on values and Consideration of Others training. This dichotomy is a sign that the values the Army teaches are not the values her soldier's see in practice.

The author's conclusion is that Army values, warfighting ethos, and professional ethic do not need to change based on changes to American society entering the 21st Century, but that the way the Army teaches them does. The problem is not that the ethic or values are wrong, rather the problem seems to be with how they are manifested and instilled in soldiers. There may be a problem with America's warrior spirit and the current readiness of individual soldiers to implement the ethic in an effective manner on the battlefield. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the field does not perceive values and consideration of others training as being related to the code of the warrior. Rather, they think it is the result of efforts to make the military more

politically correct. Not only are we disillusioning soldiers with values training that is not implemented in a manner that relates character to the requirements of combat, but we are not providing soldiers with all the training we could to enable them to fight the *berserkr* of the 21st Century. This is not to say that American soldiers cannot fight or that they will lose the next war – far from it.

AMERICANS CAN FIGHT – BUT THERE ARE LESSONS OF CHIVALRY

War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing is worth war is much worse. A man who has nothing for which he is willing to fight; nothing he cares more about than his own personal safety; is a miserable creature who has no chance of being free...

- John Stuart Mill

Today's critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army are part of a procession of critics who have questioned the American soldier's warrior spirit. The student of American history knows that the American fighting spirit has been questioned in the past. In a 1991 article for Army Magazine, GEN (R) Frederick Kroesen, noting that articles and periodicals dating back to World War I have noted a "well known" aversion of Americans for tough combat. He quotes a Chinese general, "But their infantry is weak. Their men are afraid to die and will neither press home a bold attack nor defend to the death." But the student of American history also knows the charge that Americans cannot fight is nonsense. From America's conflicts with the Indians beginning before our Revolutionary War, to gallant charges on both sides into withering gunfire during the American Civil War, to Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders to Hamburger Hill the American soldier has proven his warrior spirit. In the days before our nation was settled, our people proved that Americans are a warrior people. The following two sub-sections support this fact from both the perspective of the individual soldier, and of the Army in general.

The Killing Spirit

And Caesar's spirit, raging for revenge, With Ate by his side come hot from hell, Shall in these confines with a monarch's voice Cry "Havoc!" and let slip the dogs of war, That this foul deed shall smell above the earth. With carrion men, groaning for burial.

Marcus Antonius
 Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene I

Americans, as peoples around the world, seem to have an inbred capacity to kill and have demonstrated the capacity, for reasons that have little to do with abusive training. In his book *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, LTC and psychologist Dave Grossman describes how difficult it is for the average soldier to kill in battle. His study indicates over ninety-five percent of all soldiers have a strong aversion to killing and will pay a great price to avoid it if at possible. Grossman describes just two percent of combat soldiers that seem predisposed to killing. These soldiers do not experience the normal resistance to killing and they can kill without apparent regret or psychological cost.⁶⁹ Grossman describes one Vietnam veteran's view of human nature,

...he thought of most of the world as sheep: gentle, decent, kindly creatures who are essentially incapable of true aggression. In this veteran's mind there is another human subspecies (of which he is a member) that is a kind of dog: faithful, vigilant creatures who are very much capable of aggression when circumstances require. But, according to this model, there are wolves (sociopaths) and packs of wild dogs (gangs and aggressive armies) abroad in the land, and the sheepdogs (the soldiers and policemen of the world) are environmentally and biologically predisposed to be the ones who confront these predators.

He goes on to describe, in a line of thought that seems totally consistent with Dr. Shay's observations regarding the violation of a soldier's sense of "what's right," the circumstances where the average soldier will kill.

Grossman states that a tremendous volume of research indicates the primary factor that enables soldiers to kill is a powerful sense of accountability to their comrades. He also concludes that soldiers can be trained to kill. He makes a compelling argument that Armies can desensitize soldiers in peacetime so that it is easier for them to kill in a time of war.

Grossman thinks that modern training methods, introduced after World War II because of the low percentage of soldiers who actually participated in the engagements by shooting at the enemy, dramatically increased the percentage of soldiers who took part in the killing during Korea and Vietnam. These training methods had little to do with abuse of soldiers, rather they

desensitized soldiers to killing. The result was an increase in firing rates from 15 to 20 percent during World War II to 55 percent during the Korean War, and with further refinement to 90 to 95 percent during the Vietnam War.⁷²

The most effective desensitization techniques seemed to be those that built habits in the soldier so that he would react reflexively and without thinking in combat. The training also provided immediate feedback to the soldier. Grossman uses the example of "quick shoot" marksmanship training. In fact, the Army totally restructured its marksmanship training. During World War II, weapons firing usually consisted of the soldier and his weapon firing at a round bulls-eye target on a flat grassy range. Today soldiers fire from a variety of positions, mostly from foxholes wearing all their combat equipment. Ranges are on uneven terrain with manshaped silhouette targets located at a variety of distances up to 300 meters away. Furthermore, the targets are presented for short times, so the soldier must scan his sector and identify the target before engaging. If he hits the target, he gets immediate feedback by seeing the target fall. Soldiers train using these targets on live fire as well as qualification ranges. For added realism during close quarters or trenchline training, fixed targets may have balloons attached to them or cans filled with red paint.

Marksmanship training is not the only method the Army has used to desensitize soldiers to the realities of combat. In an Army where more and more soldiers have never been in a fistfight, pugil-stick and combatives training put the soldier in a position where he must face close-up interpersonal hostility. Medical training is frequently conducted using moulage kits that replicate realistic looking wounds. During bayonet training, the spirit of the bayonet – to kill – is drilled home to soldiers.

Critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army could point to other desensitization techniques from the Vietnam era that are discouraged today. Our Army no longer condones dehumanization of a potential enemy. In the Armies past, the enemy has been called Krauts, Japs, gooks, commies, and much more, contributing to a perception in the mind of the soldier that the enemy is an inferior being, and is thus easier to kill. Similarly running cadences that slander other nationalities are barred, and those that emphasize killing and gore are not often heard. Even though the most effective desensitization techniques seem to be those that create a reflexive reaction to shoot to kill, it is true that banning dehumanization techniques might lessen the soldier's willingness to kill. But regardless of that fact, techniques that slander others are wrong. They are not in keeping with American values and any utility they might have seems to be offset by the consistency that current policy has with stated Army values. By refusing to dehumanize the enemy, the Army refuses to erode the soldier's inner sense of "what's right."

There is a downside to desensitizing soldiers to killing and it has to do with the effect that killing has on the individual. With the exception of the two percent of "guard dogs," there is a heavy psychological cost to bear, which Grossman thinks is largely responsible for the dramatically higher frequency of PTSD among Vietnam veterans than the veterans of other wars. With regard to one veteran in particular he writes, "...consciousness of failure to act in response to conscience can lead to the greatest revulsion, not only for oneself, but for the human species." Grossman's theory is again consistent with Shay's conclusion regarding the betrayal of "what's right." The conclusion is that as the Army desensitizes and prepares the average soldier to fight the *berserkr* of the 21st Century, it must train him in a manner that makes clear the relationship between American Army values and the soldier's professional ethic. The soldier who kills for his country will have to live with the fact, and it will be even harder if noncombatants were killed as well. Perhaps it will be a bit easier if he can at least intellectually understand why his actions were morally right.

Americans are Winners

There must be within our Army, a sense of purpose and a dedication to that purpose. There must be a willingness to march a little further, carry a heavier load, to step out into the dark and unknown for the safety and well-being of others.

- General Creighton Abrams

General (Retired) Kroeson refutes the charge that Americans cannot fight by making a compelling argument based on results - victory in combat. It is still true that Americans have never lost a war on the battlefield. But beyond that, GEN (R) Kroeson's personal experience and his study of factual records lead him to conclude that Americans are much more likely to win in situations where the warrior spirit is even more of a factor that in other battles. When the fighting is desperate or when fighting is sustained he concludes that Americans are much more likely to be the victors. When combat is a surprise, Americans are much more likely to react effectively and gain the advantage. Finally, when combat requires ingenuity and initiative, he concludes Americans will "win in a walk." The will to accomplish the mission, to achieve the objective, is arguably the most critical attribute making up the warrior ethos and is clearly present in the American soldier. In the final analysis, Americans win and they match deeds to MacArthur's words, "in war there is no substitute for victory."

Kroeson is not alone in his defense of the American soldier. In a 1990 *Army Magazine* letter to the editor, LTC Arnold Freedman related his personal experiences in Vietnam in

response to a critic who questioned the willingness of American infantrymen to fight an enemy with different values. He wrote,

From my experience in the Far East, the American infantryman performed admirably under most difficult conditions against a most professional foe whose patterns of behavior were quite different from ours. I particularly resent the "infantry bashing of pseudoprofessional historians who have never experienced infantry combat.... In memory of all my magnificent comrades of World War II, Korea, the very brave and not-so-brave, the tough and the weak — when your country called you, you were there. Your defeated opponents may criticize from the bitterness of their defeat, but regardless of their alibis, you beat them.⁷⁵

Continuing the theme that "results matter," critics that question the warrior spirit of today's soldier must also account for the magnificent performance of American soldiers during the 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia. Highly trained and disciplined American soldiers quickly adapted to an enemy who fought by a different ethical standard than our own. In an article titled "Meeting the Warrior Challenge," William Hawkins writes, "America's problem is not an inability to meet the challenges posed by warrior cultures [21st Century berserkr] but rather a lack of understanding about what it is up against and what it will take to win. The Army must conduct values training to develop in the soldier's character a sense of "what's right" that is consistent with just war theory but also enables him to fight the berserkr.

The reasons Kroeson suspects that Americans have an undeserved reputation for softness are related to our national values regarding individual rights. Americans, more than other nations, employ machines, firepower, and technology to do the work in battle. Indicating we should employ every means available to save soldiers lives, Kroeson writes, "Because other nations have not been able or willing to equip their soldiers equally well is no reason ours should not overwhelm them [the enemy] with the means available rather than engage in fistfights that would prove their manhood." Enlightened leadership is another reason Americans may be perceived as being less brave. As Kroeson notes, American leaders do not expend soldiers in the tradition of the "charge of the light brigade," preferring to explore other means. Readers familiar with Russell Weigly's *American Way of War* will recognize the American pattern of tremendous application of firepower before a ground assault. Certainly our country's rich resources give us an ability to employ means unavailable to other nations, but the value we place on each life seems to play a large part as well.

Whatever the reasons for the perception, it is important for several reasons. First, as GEN (R) Kroesen points out, left unchecked it can become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Army leaders must prevent erosion of confidence by instilling the warrior ethos in our soldiers. A part of that task is instilling American values and the professional ethic as they relate to success on

the battlefield. The other reason that perceptions of American weakness are important is because they can cause the enemy to fight longer and harder than he might if he were more certain of defeat. Anything the Army can do to ensure American soldiers are not only ready and able, but also willing to kill an enemy if he resists will decrease the probability of resistance. It is in our soldier's interest that the popular perception of Army ethics not be that we are "overly sensitive" or give an enemy any reason to think that there is any sort of chivalrous American societal imperative that will give him an advantage on the battlefield.

THE LESSONS OF CHIVALRY

As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first — as at Fontenoy — preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers.

- Jomini: Precis de l'Art de la Guerre

History occasionally provides an example of a warrior so chivalrous that the value undermines his ability to win. This paper explores three lessons of chivalry relevant to the topic: 1) inability to recognize truth, 2) confusing a "just fight" with a "fair fight" that gives the enemy a chance, and 3) hubris.

Chivalry of the Middle Ages is an oft-cited example of soldiers being unable or unwilling to see truth regarding technology driven changes on the battlefield. Because the crossbow threatened the status of the noble knight and placed the class structure at risk, it was for a time outlawed in parts of Europe. Crecy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415) are famous for French arrogance and unwillingness to learn from experience that the English commoner, armed with a longbow, could defeat nobility in battle. The gun was resisted even more than the crossbow or longbow. A knight of the time complained,

Hardly a man and bravery in war are of use any longer because guile, betrayal, treachery together with the gruesome artillery pieces have taken over so much that fencing, fighting, hitting and armor, weapons, physical strength or courage are not of much use any more. Because it happens often and frequently that a virile brave hero is killed by some forsaken knave with a gun."⁷⁸

Even the most ardent critic is likely to hesitate before accusing today's Army of not trying to anticipate the future impact of technology on the battlefield. Of course, the search for truth extends well beyond the issue of technology. With respect to the warrior spirit, chivalrous

notions regarding American values must not lead to assumptions that the warriors of other nations share American values. Wishful thinking about the potential for women to assume roles they may not be able to fill because of physiological differences between men and women might be another example. The Army must search for truth regarding the characteristics of future war and then prepare for combat how it will be, not how the Army may wish it to be.

There will be those who want to interpret that fighting ethically means giving the enemy some sort of advantage in the name of fairness. This is hardly the case, although the history of chivalry provides the critics with many examples. Mao Tse-tung used the example of Duke of Sung to make the point. In 638 B.C., the Duke's army was drawn up in battle formation along a riverbank as the enemy army approached. When the enemy was half way across the river, one of the Duke's ministers urged the Duke to attack before the enemy could cross. The Duke refused. When the enemy had crossed, but not yet assembled their formations, the minister again urged the Duke to attack. The Duke again refused, signaling the attack only after the enemy had formed his forces. In the ensuing fight, the Duke was wounded and his army defeated. He is said to have claimed "I will not sound my drums to attack an unformed host." Mao's famous dictum was that, "We are not the Duke of Sung and we have no need for his asinine ethics."

There is a saying in the military that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The Law of War imperatives of "military necessity" and "proportional use of force" are embedded in our warrior ethos, and Americans are known for their sense of fair play. Still, the American soldier's warrior ethic has never succumbed to the perils of undue chivalry. Kroeson concurs when he reasons that American's "should overwhelm them [enemy] with the means available rather than engage in fist-fights that would prove our manhood." Americans pride themselves on looking for overmatch against the enemy, ambushing him or hitting him in the flank where he is not looking. Generals Patton and Swartzkopf both have scoffed at the idea of waging a "fair fight."

There is a difference between a "fair fight" and a "just fight," and Americans are also quick to stop the killing when the battle is won. Having quoted GEN Swartzkopf decrying the idea of a fair fight, there is no better example of this balance than the fire discipline American soldiers showed when given the order to "cease fire" at the conclusion of the Gulf War. The point is that Americans historically show restraint and respect for life as an elemental aspect of our warrior ethic. Americans value victory at minimal loss of life and destruction of property. The mandate to use proportional force does not in any way mean using less than overwhelming force that might risk giving the enemy a chance to succeed.

The Army must help soldiers define what constitutes a "just fight." Our soldiers must be prepared to fight the *berserkr* warrior they will meet on America's 21st Century battlefields. Growing up in our society, many young soldiers likely have pre-conceived notions of what constitutes a "fair fight" that will get them killed on the battlefield. War is tragic, and not the least tragedy is that it makes killers out of our youth. If employed in some regions, there will be times American soldiers will be shot at by women and children, men using women and children as shields and in a variety of other morally ambiguous situations. Mogadishu is a fine example. Teaching our soldiers the legality of who is a combatant and who isn't is just one measure that will help prepare them for those occasions when they are under fire and must return fire to kill or be killed.

Recall Dr. Shay's theory that the breakdown of character and discipline begins when the soldier's sense of "what's right" is betrayed. The Army must prepare soldiers, as best it can, to determine "what is right" in morally ambiguous situations because when the soldier finds that a woman or child died in a just fight, he will have to live with it. Chivalrous notions of what is a "just fight" that go beyond the requirement of the law of war and more importantly in terms of a soldier's sense of "what's right," the higher religious and ethical values upon which that law is based, will get our soldiers killed. Preparing soldiers for combat against the 21st Century berserkr starts with how the Army teaches values and the professional ethic in basic training and how it sustains that training in units.

The Bushido, or the warrior code of the Samurai warrior, also contains lessons regarding the damage chivalry can produce. In *The Code of the Warrior*, Rick Fields describes the evolution of the Bushido. As with the warriors of other societies, the Samurai's fierceness was born out of a need to protect others; in his case, the Ruler and the country. Facing death regularly, the Samurai were motivated to learn the art of liberation from the fear of death. Zen Buddhism provided the Samurai spiritual and martial benefits. Through meditation, the warrior experienced the illusory nature of self and with the death of the illusory ego, was released "from the bondage of birth and death." By the 1300s, the search for inner strength had caused the Samurai to lose focus on the purpose of the warrior and in Fields words, place means before ends. He relates the example of a great Samurai warrior Kusunoke.⁸¹

Kusunoke was ordered by the emperor to defend an untenable position at the Battle of Minato River. Realizing the fight was hopeless, he proposed an alternate plan which the emperor rejected. As Kusunoke anticipated, the battle was lost. Fighting valiantly until nightfall, bleeding from eleven wounds, Kusunoke retreated with his brother to a small farmhouse where they cut open their stomachs and finished each other with their swords. While Kusunoke failed

in his mission, he became one of Japan's most popular heroes. Fields quotes Ivan Morris in *The Nobility of Failure*, "[Kusunoke] most perfectly exemplified the Japanese heroic parabola: wholehearted effort on the behalf of a hopeless cause, leading to initial achievement and success, but ending in glorious failure and a brave, poignant death." Fields concludes that failure became the occasion for the warrior to demonstrate his sincerity, noting the sincere warrior always placed means before ends.

The sin of hubris is closely related and intertwined with undue chivalry. It was the French nobility's pride and disdain of the English commoner that blinded them to the truths of change on the battlefield at Crecy, Pointiers, and Againcourt. This paper has raised concerns regarding standards of individual training, the warrior spirit, and the development of soldier values and character. Assuming there are physiological and perhaps societal differences between men and women, our nation must be very careful of hubris. Many critics today are answering the question Stephanie Gutmann asks in the title of her book "The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can America's Gender Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars?" with the answer no. While the author thinks this is wrong and that her book is somewhat biased, there is cause for concern and introspection regarding many of the issues she raises. Some change is in order. 'While there does not seem much doubt that we will win our next war, in many parts of the world the first battles could be costly. It would be tragic to lose even one soldier if, like the Samurai, we allowed ourselves to place the means of achieving a gender-neutral force to supercede the end of victory at least cost on the battlefield.

It is imperative that our Army instill in its soldiers a warrior spirit and code of conduct that enables them to fight with competence and honor. Army values must be taught and integrated into training so as to build character that will stand up in combat. The Army in peacetime must help shape the soldier's sense of "what's right" so they can ethically fight against warriors who do not share the American soldier's ethic. Such preparation should aim at preventing a sense of betrayal that leads to a breakdown of character and discipline. In order to accomplish this, there must be an extremely tight linkage, vertically and horizontally, between the nations and the Army's values, ethics, ethos, spirit and code of conduct. Most importantly, deeds must match words on the part of the nation, it's Army and Army leaders so that the soldier intuitively knows he is fighting a just war.

SECTION 4: CHANGING MISSIONS AND LESSONS OF THE TAOIST WARRIOR

Anyone can become angry – that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way – that is not easy.

- Aristotle

In addition to those critics concerned about the effects of the integration of women into the service and other social issues, there are those who relate the Term Kinder, Gentler Army to peacekeeping and the Operations Other Than War missions the Army is increasingly assigned. One example occurs in a *U.S. News & World Report* article by Richard Newman titled "Can Peacekeepers Make War?" Newman is typical in that he cites mounting evidence that combat skills and the warrior ethic are being eroded, at least in part, by the nature of peacekeeping operations. The result, these critics claim, is a Kinder, Gentler soldier and Army.

Critics of the effects of operations short of war on the warrior spirit seem to believe in what the author will refer to as a "flip a switch" mindset. The "flip a switch" theory is that there are distinctly different and incompatible mindsets required for war and operations other than war such as peacekeeping. Stephanie Gutmann writes that we ask our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen to act like social workers and "then expecting them at the flick of a switch to morph right back into full Sergeant Fury warrior mode." Opinions such as this are voiced not only by inexperienced civilians, but also by soldiers and veterans. Gutmann quotes an Army NCO, "You're either making war-fighters or your not. We're making peacekeepers here." These critics imply there is a clear distinction between peacekeeping and combat. Newman asks, "Are they [Army soldiers] warriors whose main job is to fight and win wars? Or police assigned to prop up struggling nations and keep the world safe for American commerce?" The implication is that the Army can do one mission or the other, but not both.

These critics correlate a lack of clarity about the soldier's role in human conflict with a lack of clarity about the Army's role in society; it is proper they should make this correlation.

However, the author hypothesizes that these criticisms are wrong on two counts. First, they make a sharper distinction between war and peacekeeping than actually exists and second, they incorrectly presume the Army has no proper role in peace operations that the critics sometimes disparagingly refer to as "police actions." In fact, there is a continuum of conflict where there is a broad range of missions in uncertain threat environments that may at any time transition to combat and require overwhelming lethal force. The clean break between peacekeeping in a benign environment and war in a hostile one is wishful thinking.

Another problem with critics who too narrowly define what it means for the Army to "win the nations wars" is that they often insinuate or seem to presume that war properly unleashes unrestrained violence. This is wrong and the issue for the soldier is not to either apply restraint in operations short of war or to "morph into Sergeant Fury," a term which calls to mind visions of the undisciplined *berserkr*. As we have seen, restraint is required of the soldier in war as well as peacekeeping. The Law of War's dictums regarding military necessity and proportional use of force were designed for war, not operations short of it. A quote from TC 27-10-3, *Instructor's Guide: The Law of War*,

The law of war does not prohibit you from fighting effectively and well. The men who drafted the Hague and the Geneva Conventions knew that war could not be transformed into a polite chess game. In war, people suffer and property is destroyed. The law of war forbids only unnecessary suffering and destruction. The Hague and Geneva Conventions were drafted by men who understood the requirements of military necessity.⁸⁷

There is no place in our nation for a warrior who makes no attempt to control the passions roused in battle. The authors of the Law of War understood that on the battlefield it is usually kill or be killed. But even in combat once an enemy has surrendered or otherwise fallen into friendly hands, there is no reason to kill and the laws of war require a soldier to show restraint. The difference between war and operations such as peacekeeping is not whether restraint is required, it is the degree of restraint required. Of course, in operations short of war, as the critics intuitively understand, the always difficult challenge to balance necessity with restraint is exponentially more difficult and puts even greater stress on the soldier's sense of "what's right."

This section will explore these thoughts in a bit more detail to show why the Army must have a professional ethic and instill in our soldiers a warrior spirit that enables them to operate effectively in missions across the continuum of conflict. This section also invalidates the assumption that the role of the Army is either peacekeeping (OOTW) or war, but not both and consequently the belief that the soldier's role can be either professional warrior or peacekeeper but not both. More importantly, it will invalidate the critic's assumption that the code and spirit of an American warrior is, by definition, unable to accommodate missions across the continuum of conflict. The paper will conclude that a professional soldier should be expected to serve the nation throughout the continuum of conflict and that only minor adjustments to the warrior code and spirit might help accomplish this. Some will immediately say it is one thing for someone writing in the comfort of his home to write about the ease with which a soldier should be able to transition between hostile, uncertain and benign environments, but that very few soldiers have

the character and training to do it. Section five will examine to what degree the limits of our human nature may make this an unattainable goal.

WAR, MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR, AND POLITICS

Peacekeeping is not the soldier's job, but only the soldier can do it.

- Charles Moskos⁸⁸

The roots of the debate about the role of the American soldier in society lie in the debate about the role and purpose of America's armed forces. It should go without saying that the Army's underlying purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars, and to prepare for war in times of peace. But the nature of international affairs does not make the relationship between the military and the society it serves quite so clean as fighting wars and staying at home to prepare for war in peace. Rather, conflict of one degree or another is the constant state of international affairs and, along with the other elements of national power, the military has a role in ensuring American foreign policy succeeds across the conflict spectrum.

Conflict is not distinct and apart from economic development, open markets, rule of law, human rights, and other aspects of international affairs. Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is an extension of politics is often misunderstood. The diplomatic and military instruments of power are not applied sequentially, rather they are intertwined throughout the conduct of foreign affairs. Foreign policy is all about resolving conflict, and thus the use, threat of use, and even latent existence of military force, is an integrated part of foreign policy, affecting and being affected by all its other aspects. Thus military power, or the lack thereof, cannot be kept from affecting foreign policy, even if it were desirable.

It is hard and it takes courage to recognize truth, adapt, and move into the future. Not only chivalry, but distorted professionalism can obstruct the discernment of reality. Anthony Hartle warned of society's need to guard against the abuse of professional monopoly. While few professionals in any field would intentionally deceive those they serve, a natural inclination is to see things the way one wants to see them as opposed to the way they are. Professionals in all fields must guard against this tendency more than most citizens since "corporateness" (establishing its own criteria of competence and policing its own ranks) is a distinguishing characteristic of a profession. History is full of examples of armies that protected self-defined operational concepts and doctrine rather than attempt change so as to better serve their nation's interests. From this perspective, our Army today must guard against merely falling back on the accepted principle that the Army's purpose is to fight and win wars without deep introspection about how to define the wars the nation needs won.

The United States Army of the late 20th and early 21st Centuries might learn from the German Army of 1918. In a 1990 Parameters article, A.J. Bacevich described how prior to 1918 the Germans had drifted away from "decision-oriented warfare." Conceding the Army could not deliver the "one commodity society demanded of its Army – victory," the German Army examined itself and redefined what battle meant to the German society the Army was serving. ⁸⁹ What popularly became known as Blitzkrieg achieved remarkable success at the start of WWII, yet the generals still got it wrong. Bacevich writes,

Intent upon a paradigm of warfare in which their own highly technical skills reigned supreme, when it came to strategy, German generals contented themselves with the facile assumption that "the mere accumulation of success" in the field would somehow eventually produce final victory. Thus, in pursuing its own institutional aims, the Wehrmacht succumbed to operational aimlessness. The Third Reich's centrifugal inclinations fed a continuous expansion of war aims, offering ample opportunity for dazzling tactical success that might earn for its architect a field marshal's baton. But ultimately such achievements contributed nothing except to the exhaustion and collapse of Germany. ⁹⁰

Because the German generals divorced themselves from influencing political objectives, the tactical and operational success counter-intuitively contributed to strategic failure. One might argue the German generals could not have influenced a mad Hitler, but that argument misses the point that politics and use of military force remained intertwined in peace and war. Military force must be used to support diplomacy throughout the continuum of conflict with the military effort aimed at shaping the peace and setting conditions for a political end that protects the nation's interests. In fact, a strong nation with well-balanced instruments of power might well win a conflict without ever resorting to open warfare. This inextricable linkage of the political and the military in time and across the continuum of conflict is also what Sun Tzu was writing about in his famous dictum that the ablest general will win without fighting.

For Army leadership not to be involved on the political front is to abdicate responsibility for helping the political leadership solve the problems of the time. Bacevich quotes General Beck who learned the lesson too well: "He who follows a false tradition of the unpolitical soldier and restricts himself to his military craft neglects an essential part of his sworn duty as a soldier in a democracy." The political needs of the country must drive the Army in its quest to serve the nation rather than Army desires about what war ought to be. There must be an honest search for truth about what type of conflict is important to the nation and professional soldiers must be willing to face up to that truth. They must then transform their armies to the reality of what that type of war is, not continue to build an Army to fight the war they might wish it to be. The Prototype Draft of FM 1, *The Army*, recognizes this mandate when it declares the Army's

purpose has "always been to serve the American Republic. Often this has meant fighting and winning the nations wars." 92

"MODERN WAR" FOR THE AMERICAN SOLDIER OF THE 21ST CENTURY Qui desiderat pacem, para bellum.

- Flavius Vegetius Renatus

Critics are already taking issue with an Army purpose to "serve the Republic" as opposed to "fight and win wars." As this paper has demonstrated, for those with an understanding about the proper relationship between the military and political arms of government, the argument becomes largely one of semantics. The question is "what type of wars are America's wars of the 21st Century?" While there is continued debate about what exactly the answer is, it is increasingly recognized and accepted that the answer entails conflict across the continuum from humanitarian relief to maneuver warfare.

Indeed, the current debate about the Army's participation in operations short of war seems to be about establishing parameters for these operations, not whether the Army will be involved in them or not. There is concern about long-term deployments that reduce the combat readiness of participating units. There is concern about the growing number of long-term deployments simultaneously ongoing; deployments that tie-down forces and do not seem to go away. There is concern that recent peace efforts resorted to the military instrument of power too soon and without doing enough with the other elements of national power first. There is debate about creating peacekeeping forces that could replace the Army when the security situation allowed. There is concern that the Army, rather than simply providing a secure environment for civilian agencies and organizations to do the job of developing civilian institutions, gets overly involved in nation-building. This entire debate deals with the specifics of how soldiers will be committed to operations other than war, not whether they will be committed. As GEN Shelton, said in a 14 December 2000 address to the National Press Club. "It's clear the military will continue to become involved in areas other than just those that affect our vital national interests. The strategic environment will undoubtedly cause us to deploy forces to achieve limited military objectives. 93

The warrior ethic is a critical component to successful employment of the military as an instrument of national power across the continuum of conflict. It is the ability of the soldier to fight, if necessary, that often gives him legitimacy to do the other jobs and keep the peace at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. It is the clear ability and willingness to use lethal force that

that often deters aggression or the escalation of violence. While there are other reasons as well, in the final analysis it is this essential truth that have led sociologist Charles Moskos and others to conclude that peacekeeping is not the job of soldiers, but only soldiers can do it. GEN Colin L. Powell expressed the thought during the Press Conference on the Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review on September 1, 1993,

Because we are able to fight and win the nations wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these other new missions that are coming along – peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief – you name it we can do it... but we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces – to fight and win the nations wars. ⁹⁴

The conclusion is that, while refinement of the role will continue, America's Army will appropriately serve the nation in operations across the continuum of conflict in the 21st Century. This will require a warrior spirit and code applicable across the continuum of conflict as well. The Marine Corps seems to accept this reality by preparing for a "three-block war" where individual marines must be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance on one city block, conduct peacekeeping operations between warring factions on a second block, while engaging in combat on the third. While we may not yet be in the world of the "three block war," critics who expect soldiers to have a "flip the switch" mentality of either "clear peace" or "clear war" will doom our soldiers to failure. These critics may resent the fact that the wars they would like to fight are not the same wars the nation needs fought, but to again quote GEN (R) Powell and one of his leadership rules, they need to "get mad, then get over it." The paper will next explore lessons from the Kung Fu warrior monks of the Chinese Tao that might be helpful to the American soldier of the 21st Century.

LESSONS OF THE TAO TE CHING

Warriorship is a continual journey
To be a warrior
Is to learn to be genuine
In every moment of your life
That is the warrior's discipline

Chogyam Trungpa

With the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war compressed and overlapping to a much greater extent than at any time in our nation's history, the character and judgement of the individual soldier is more important than ever. The decisions and actions of a small unit leader

or soldier can have an immediate strategic impact that was a rare exception in the past.

Restraint is the principle of operations other than war that, when violated, will most likely embroil the nation in a deeper conflict.

In his book *The Postmodern Military*, Charles Moskos concludes that the Army of the 21st Century will be more multi-purpose in its mission and will apply force more gradually in response to enemy threats. He also declares the postmodern military to be increasingly androgynous in make-up and ethos. ⁹⁶ Increased restraint seems to be at least a part of what he sees changing in the military. The question recurs, what, if anything, needs to change in the code or professional ethic of the American soldier to accommodate the type of war we will fight in the 21st Century.

Circa 400 B.C., Shaolin monks in China were developing a warrior code employing martial arts in a unique balance between the extremes of aggression and pacifistic surrender. Restraint might be called the guiding principle of Kung Fu and the Taoist warrior. The code evolved into what is sometimes called the Taoist warrior who, understanding the problem of the berserkr, realized that, "Military force is like fire – if not kept in check, it will end by consuming the user." The warrior monks did not believe in war and sought to resolve conflict peacefully. But the Taoist also realized that most men were not so peace loving and to preserve peace they recognized they must be prepared for war. It was necessary to study the martial arts as well as their religion, the Tao Te Ching.

Unlike other warriors, the Taoist warrior fought to win in the name of peace. In his book, *The Code of the Warrior*, Rick Fields writes that he did not fight out of greed or anger. Unlike the examples of chivalrous Chinese knights of the time, the warrior monk did not fight to prove his bravery. ⁹⁸ The Taoist warrior understood the limits of force and the principle that "violence begets violence." Verse thirty of the Tao says,

Whenever you advise a ruler in the way of Tao, Counsel him not to use force to conquer the universe. For this would only cause resistance. Thorn bushes spring up wherever the army has passed. Lean years follow in the wake of a great war. Just do what needs to be done. Never take advantage of power.⁹⁹

The Taoist was a realist and Fields calls Sun Tzu the most realistic and practical of the Taoists. While violence was to be avoided, it was not to be avoided at all costs. Sun Tzu's classic guide to warfare is firmly grounded in the Taoists abhorrence of violence. We have already referred to Sun Tzu's dictum that "...to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles

is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."¹⁰¹ The use of deception, intelligence, spies, all elements of power, and perhaps above all, a deep understanding of both oneself and the enemy were all required to win without having to resort to force. Force was a last resort after all other means were exhausted, and even then, the wise commander would only go to war after careful consideration and an in-depth assessment of the situation. Once the decision for war was final, the goal was to win as quickly as possible with a minimum amount of death and destruction.

In his book, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in the Twenty-First Century Warfare, John Alexander postulates that critics confuse the object of war as being the death and destruction of the enemy. This thought seems consistent with research done for this paper, such as the Stephanie Gutmann simplification of what she claims has "always been the Infantryman's code" to "kill people and blow things up." Totally consistent with the idea that war is an extension of politics. Alexander reminds us that Clausewitz taught that the object of war was the imposition of will. 103 In doing so, he also reminds us that the warrior traditions of western democracy has always been about the controlled vice uncontrolled use of violence. Like the Taoist monk, Alexander understands that use of force usually continues the cycle of violence, concluding that force options that limit violence have inherent advantages over those that accentuate them. Thus, critics who assume the warrior mindset requires a focus on killing as the end miss the point. These critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army that assume the warrior must always kill his enemy seem to be those of the "flip a switch" persuasion that think there must be one mindset for the peacekeeper and another for the warrior. However, the warrior who understands that imposition of will, not killing, is the goal of the warrior may have a mindset that can accommodate a sliding scale of force application that is applicable across the conflict continuum.

Fields anticipates that some might be tempted to misunderstand the monks reluctance to fight with chivalry and the idea a "fair fight," or giving the enemy a fighting chance. Contrasting the Chinese knights' chivalry with the strategy of the Taoist, he writes,

...strategy was the opposite of chivalry. If the gentleman knight fought to demonstrate his aristocratic superiority – his prowess, virtue, or manner – the strategist fought to win. The knight never took advantage, while the strategist took every advantage he could. But even though Chinese chivalry and strategy were opposite, both had a common underlying purpose. They were both attempts to minimize, contain, or control the violence of warfare. 104

Neither the Tao, nor our Judeo-Christian heritage, disallow taking advantage of a hostile enemy in a just cause. 105 While concepts such as taking the enemy unaware, deception and

trickery were unethical to the chivalrous knight, by the Taoist strategist they were regarded as the application of superior intelligence and knowledge against a much more brutal and unfair enemy.

It is again important to reiterate the difference between giving the enemy a "fair fight" in the sense of a chance to win and acting honorably and justly. American experience in Mogadishu and Russian experience in Grozny must give one pause about how Americans will be able to ethically conduct themselves when confronted with warriors with little or no ethical standards. Such reflection seems to have caused some to insinuate that perhaps American soldiers need to reevaluate ethics, lower standards, and fight the enemy on their own terms. The author believes American Army ethics are not only what they should be, but even if the Army wanted to change them, it could not do so in time for next war. The sense of "what's right" in the American soldiers who will fight our next battles has already been established for generations to come – they are firmly planted in the national psyche of what it means to be an American and American mothers and fathers raise their children in this context.

Those who think that a change in the soldier's ethos is required might consider the Taoist distinction between ethics and the rules for the conduct of war. Rather than change our ethics, we should inculcate some of the lessons of the Taoist warrior into our own warrior code and how we prepare our soldiers for future combat. Our soldiers must be taught, as our manuals now state, to win with minimum necessary force based on the situation or environment they are in. But even during operations short of war that require significant restraint, our soldiers must be prepared to use deadly force objectively and rationally when required in a just cause. Against an enemy, he must have no compunction about applying overwhelming force at the point of decision, unexpectedly if possible. But as soon as victory is secured, a rapid deescalation of violence is necessary. As with the warrior monk who flexibly adapts to the enemy, soldiers must be prepared to adjust the application of force as the enemy changes behavior. Our soldiers require training, tools, and options they do not currently have, but there is precedence in our society for such an application of force. Many will probably want to misinterpret that the author wants to turn soldiers into policemen, but many of the insights and methods can be found in U.S. law enforcement agencies.

CODE OF THE WARRIOR AND THE LESSONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Whether you are a U.S. soldier deployed to Haiti or Bosnia or an urban police officer, you currently have few options when faced with a threatening situation. Rightly, we in the United States are still bound by a tradition of proportional use of force, but our adversaries are not. ¹⁰⁶

- GEN (R) John J. Sheehan

This paper hypothesizes that one mindset, borne in a soldier of character, allows the soldier to adapt to benign, uncertain and hostile environments as appropriate. Perhaps it is the lack of non-lethal options that creates skepticism in the minds of the "flip a switch" critics about a warrior code that is applicable across the spectrum of conflict. Tools to empower soldiers and provide them non-lethal options in situations short of war include an ever-growing arsenal of non-lethal weapons, rules of engagement, and training.

Law enforcement agencies train their officers and agents to use minimum force in a manner somewhat similar to the warrior monk. Federal law enforcement agencies use the term, "force continuum," to represent the variety of coercive options available to agents in confrontational settings. Civilian law enforcement officers are taught a "graduated response" application of force, sometimes using the analogy of a sliding scale or rheostat. Options range from verbal persuasion to lethal force. If the situation allows, an intended gap between the verbal warning and the use of lethal force allows for a de-escalation of the situation as the threat dissipates.

In October 1995, the Treasury and Justice Departments issued uniform policies for the use of deadly force by their bureaus and agencies. As a result, federal law enforcement agencies to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) all have essentially the same standards with minor exceptions resulting from unique missions. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Use-of-Force Model is the standard.

The FLETC Use-of-Force Model consists of five color-coded levels of force that correspond to an officer's perception about the level of threat he is confronted with. It describes the escalation and de-escalation of force based on a demonstrated level of compliance by the subjects involved. Table 2 shows the levels of threat and the corresponding level of force. ¹⁰⁹

Federal law enforcement policy permits law enforcement officers to use deadly force only when an officer has reasonable belief there is imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. Naturally, officers and agents are taught how to recognize the perceived level of threat they face and how to respond appropriately.

Corresponding Force
Communication such as verbal commands
Low-level physical tactics, such as
grabbing a suspects arm.
Use of come-along holds, pressure points,
and chemical sprays.
Defensive tactics, such as striking maneuvers
with the hands or a baton
Deadly force

Table 2

The considerations for a law enforcement officer to use force are similar to those that could be used by soldiers in a threatening situation during a peace operation. Some considerations include: number of participants on each side; size, age, and condition of the participants; record and/or reputation of the suspect for violence; nature of the offense for which the suspect is being confronted; use of alcohol or drugs; mental or psychiatric history; presence of innocent bystanders; and availability of less violent or non-lethal weapons. As one would suspect, initial training is intensive and sustainment training is conducted once assigned to the force. FLETC training includes: 175 hours of classroom instruction/lectures; 117 hours of laboratory work (practical skills); 39 hours of practical exercises; and five written exams.

Army Military Police (MPs) are trained in a similar manner as federal agents. The governing Army Regulation is AR 190-14, *Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties*. AR 190-14 also requires use of the minimum force necessary, and describes seven options: verbal persuasion; unarmed defense techniques; chemical aerosol irritant projectors; MP club; military working dogs; presentation of deadly force capability; deadly force. AR 190-14 prescribes six situations justifying deadly force. The critical point is not that soldiers conducting operations short of war should be trained to do police work. Rather, that law enforcement provides a rich source of experience and material for training programs that would instill a similar reflex of rapid situation assessment and proportional application of force in soldiers as in law enforcement officers. American special operations forces are already trained to apply minimum force in an escalation, de-escalation manner based on the mission and threat.

There are other law enforcement techniques can also reinforce Army doctrine and procedures for operations short of war. For example, the anonymity of a crowd often enables members of a mob to commit acts they would not do alone. In his book *On Killing*, Dave Grossman uses the example of a lynching. Police are taught to attempt to isolate members of a threatening group by calling them by name where possible, thus reducing their identification with the group so that they begin to think of themselves as individuals with personal accountability.

Rules of Engagement also guide the soldier in the application of force and are particularly important in uncertain threat environments. This is not the place to discuss ROE in detail or to examine past problems with their use; it is the place to note that in operations short of war, ROE must support a seamless sliding scale of force options. ROE must be simple and in plain language that can be easily understood and applied by a soldier in the confusion of combat. ROE are effective only to the extent that they can be understood and applied. The tendency to write thick volumes of ROE in legal language that covers every technicality must be avoided, since they are liable to do more harm to the individual soldier than good.

The growing number and availability of non-lethal weapons provide soldiers additional means to accomplish their mission with minimal force. They help to fill a gap in capability and provide the soldier greater flexibility to respond to a wide range of threats. Non-lethal weapons increase the possibility of de-escalating a tense situation and of allowing soldiers to maintain control without resorting to deadly force that would likely be responded to in kind.

For the soldier, non-lethal weapons must always be accompanied by an overt and obvious presence of lethal force. Ralph Peters explained why when he noted that the only thing that will stop the warrior thug is the sure knowledge that his life is being threatened. Alexander writes,

As a matter of principle, non-lethal weapons should never be employed without adequate lethal support that is clearly displayed to the adversary. There must be no doubt in the mind of the aggressor that we possess sufficient force to accomplish the mission, and that we are prepared to use force should the situation so dictate. Further, they should know that our troops are not required to use non-lethal force before shooting to kill. 114

The passage serves as a reminder that competence, demonstrated capability and the certainty in the enemy's mind that the American soldier is ready, willing, and able to kill him that often empowers the soldier to effectively employ restraint. It is the presence of overwhelming force and the principle of "ensured response" to use it that might deter a warrior. Capability combined with the right professional ethic and a warrior spirit to enact it will allow soldiers

engaged in operations short of war, in President Teddy Roosevelt's words, to "walk softly, but carry a big stick."

In *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Kenneth Allard writes, "Peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude and approach by the individual to a set of circumstances different from those normally found on the field of battle – an adjustment to suit the needs of peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action." A warrior code grounded in a philosophy of force application along a sliding scale of options based on the perceived threat would enable soldiers to adjust their attitude and approach as the situation changes. Soldier's actions change based on the situation, but the mindset to rapidly assess the situation and to gauge an appropriate response remains the same.

SECTION 5: THEORY INTO PRACTICE

The atrocities of war are not committed by abnormal men. The tragedy of war is that the atrocities of war are not committed by abnormal men, but by normal men in abnormal circumstances where the ebb and flow of every day life are replaced by a constant round of fear and anger and blood and death. Soldiers at war are not to be judged by civilian rules... even though they commit acts that afterwards seem unchristian and brutal.

- MAJ Thomas, Lawyer in Breaker Morant

One problem with all this neat theory regarding a Code of the Warrior is man's track record of putting it into practice. History, to include American history, is replete with failures of soldiers to control their bloodlust in combat. Just some of the more well known examples include atrocities by American soldiers and Marines fighting the Japanese in a brutal war in the Pacific theater during World War II – for instance soldiers collecting the skulls of Japanese dead and Marines mutilating Japanese soldiers, sometimes while they were still alive. American massacres at No Gun Ri during the Korean War and at Mai Lai during the Vietnam War are other extreme examples that make the point. These atrocities all occurred in outfits with values as closely connected to American values as today's Army.

The problem, of course, is the innate weakness and failings of human nature exposed to the ultimate test of a man's character – combat. In his book, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, Jonathan Shay relates how most of us have a, "satisfaction through comforting fantasy that our own character would hold steady under the most extreme pressure of dreadful events. A permanent challenge of working with those injured by combat trauma is facing the painful awareness that in all likelihood one's own character

would not have stood firm."¹¹⁷ Reinforcing the point, Grossman quotes a soldier in his book *On Killing*,

You put those same kids in the jungle for a while, get them real scared, deprive them of sleep, and let a few incidents change some of their fears to hate. Give them a sergeant who has seen too many of his men killed by booby traps and by lack of distrust, and who feels the Vietnamese are dumb, dirty, and weak, because they are not like him. Add a little mob pressure and those nice kids who accompany us today would rape like champions. Kill, rape, and steal is the name of the game. ¹¹⁸

Those without firsthand experience of the intensity of prolonged combat must be careful about rushing to judge soldiers who have succumbed to the stresses of combat and violated the professional soldiers ethic. While it is fairly easy in a research paper to develop an ethical warrior code, it is much more difficult to live up to that code and instill it as a practical matter, in our soldiers so that it truly guides action. It is particularly difficult for those soldiers who will be exposed to conflict soon after being inducted and who have minimal training. Regarding civil and moral law, Thomas Aquinas thought the virtuous could impose more on the weak than the weak could bear, resulting in unenforceable laws. Some critics think the man who can handle both the peacekeeping and warfighting mission are rare. Given some of the soldier experiences examined thus far, it may be closer to reality to conclude that the man who survives either environment without betraying his sense of "what's right" is rare.

But it is not clear to most people that there is a set of moral absolute laws by which soldiers in combat should be measured. Many observers believe that war is fundamentally amoral and that civilians ought not to examine the soldier's behavior too closely. The guidelines of necessity and proportionality sometimes require action that may seem heartless and cruel, such as destroying the electronic power grid to a city which places hardship on innocent citizens. Glover writes, "But in the heat of battle, whether the enemy be a Russian, an Argentinian, or even an IRA terrorist, things are necessarily and rightly done which later, in the frigidity of a law court, may seem outrageous – for war is a rough game." And Ralph Peters reflects that it is easy to second guess the warrior, "its not a matter of condoning war crimes. It's a matter of understanding the fundamental speed, confusion, terror and eruptive violence of warfare. An Army should be as moral as practical, but to me, war is by its very nature a fundamentally amoral act. So it's a matter of degrees, not absolutes."

But difficulties living up to a goal do not make a worthy goal something one should not aspire to achieve. Those who argue it is easier to preach battlefield ethics than to live up to them in combat, often make the argument of expediency – that the ends can justify the means.

Expediency accounts for many an atrocity in war. For example, when soldiers know the enemy tortures prisoners and when enemy prisoners are slow to talk about reports of an imminent attack, there may be the temptation to resort to torture for information. Expediency encourages the tendency to focus on immediate tangible problems to the exclusion of consequences beyond the near term. Sir James Glover writes,

The soldier must reject brutality because by matching the terrorists at their own methods the soldier will only be playing into their own hands. The threshold of violence will escalate. Ultimately, he will find himself using methods so outrageous that not only will they revolt his own conscience but they will also attract the hatred of the very people whom he is protecting and whose support is vital to him. 122

In *Just and Unjust Wars*, Michael Walzer concludes that soldiers should generally be held accountable for their actions in combat. He considers the soldier who claims a sort of temporary insanity, who in a frenzy of fear, cannot recognize the moment when he is no longer in danger. He observes that when enemy soldiers are killed trying to surrender it is normally a small number of men who do the killing. Walzer notes that most soldiers are ready to stop as soon as they can no matter what state of mind they had worked themselves into during the battle. His conclusion is that not only is the enemy's right to surrender recognizable, but that most soldiers recognize that right in combat. His final conclusion is that the men who do such shooting are responsible for what they do. ¹²³ While due consideration of the entire context of their acts is appropriate, they must be held accountable for their actions.

Holding soldiers accountable for their actions has to be the right thing to do. This does not mean that the stress and strain of combat that cause ordinary men to waver should not be considered. Lieutenant General Sir James Glover, noting that soldiers not only have the right but the duty to disobey unlawful orders writes, "It is one of his [the soldier's] privileges for serving in a democracy, as it is one of the burdens, that he must answer for his own actions." He goes on to describe how Great Britain has systemized a method to help ensure discipline and accountability in counterinsurgency operations where Glover thinks the strains placed on the soldier's conscience are greatest. He states that every soldier in Northern Ireland who accidentally kills a civilian, whether by mistaken identity or ricochet bullet, is put on trial in a civil court. He notes how SAS personnel who shot the terrorists in the Iranian Embassy siege in London were tried – and exonerated. The British seem to understand, most certainly from experience, that once the first atrocity is committed and the soldier's sense of "what's right" betrayed, it is a slippery slope down to the depths of unethical behavior that undermine mission and will.

The conclusion is that most soldiers do recognize when it is time to apply restraint in combat and that the Army must hold soldiers accountable for their actions. Certainly each case must be examined individually and judgements reached only after considering all the facts and circumstances. The Army can empathize with the soldier and even give him the benefit of the doubt. Yet, to not ultimately hold soldiers accountable for conducting themselves in accordance with our values and the laws of war is to make our soldiers and our institutions no better than the unconstrained and unethical *berserkrs* we are liable to be fighting.

CONCLUSION

... Abides by this resolve, and stops not there, But makes his moral being his prime care; Who, doomed to go in company with Pain, And Fear, and Bloodshed, miserable train! Turns his necessity to glorious gain; In face of these doth exercise a power Which is our human nature's highest dower; Controls them and subdues, transmutes, bereaves Of their bad influence, and their good receives; By objects, which might force the soul to abate Her feeling, rendered more compassionate; Is placable - because occasions rise So often that demand such sacrifice; More skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure, As tempted more: more able to endure, As more exposed to suffering and distress; Thence, also, more alive to tenderness. - 'Tis he whose law is reason; who depends Upon that law as on the best of friends; Whence, in a stage where men are tempted still To evil for a guard against worse ill, And what quality or act is best Doth seldom on a right foundation rest, He labours good on good to fix, and owes To virtue every triumph that he knows....

William Wordsworth
 excerpt from Character of the Happy Warrior

Men of character must fight the nation's wars with a combination of great ability and compassion. Not only are the values of dignity, respect, and compassion appropriate for the

professional soldier, they are essential to the Code of the Warrior as developed in most every civilized society throughout man's history. The warrior code is based on an innate respect for others, most especially the enemy. While rare, men who embody these qualities have fought throughout history. Perhaps there is no better example than Joshua Chamberlain of the 20th Maine during the American Civil War.

While probably best known for the classic warrior qualities of courage, audacity, and initiative that he showed at Gettysburg on 2 July 1863, Chamberlain was also a remarkably compassionate soldier, considerate of those around him. He accomplished the mission while caring greatly for his soldiers. He is famous for repelling a Confederate assault on the Little Round Top with a bayonet assault after his regiment took heavy casualties and was almost out of ammunition. What is less well known is that under most other commanders, the 20th Maine may not have had enough soldiers in formation to defend the Little Round Top. Two days before the Battle of Gettysburg, one third of the soldiers who fought with Chamberlain were brought to the 20th Maine as prisoners. Chamberlain was given orders to shoot them if necessary, but an act of kindness motivated these men to fight. Either not realizing, or disdaining, the custom of the day that mutineers be treated with contempt, Chamberlain fed the men and listened to their grievances. Believing in the dignity of man, he treated 120 prisoners with respect and motivated them to fight not reluctantly, but to follow him in a bayonet assault when they all realized the unit was almost beaten. While this paper has made a point of noting how competence can enable compassion, one might argue that at Gettysburg, Chamberlain's compassion enabled his competence.

Chamberlain, like Alexander the Great, also provides an example of how magnanimity in victory can help win the peace after a bloody conflict. After Gettysburg, Chamberlain went on to greater achievement in the Civil War. Wounded six times during the war, he was promoted to brigadier general for heroism at Petersburg and was promoted to brevet major general for heroism at Five Forks. He was so highly regarded that General Ulysses S. Grant chose him to receive the Confederate surrender at Appomattox. Chamberlain called the Union Army to attention and they saluted the defeated Confederates as they marched past. Criticized by some in the North, many historians credit Chamberlain's act with greatly contributing to healing the wounds of a divided nation and speeding reconstruction. 126

Chamberlain's example illustrates the proper relationship between the values of dignity and respect and the warrior spirit.

KEY JUDGEMENTS

They were killing my friends

- Audie Murphy when asked what motivated him in the action for which he earned the Medal of Honor
- As with warrior codes throughout history, the professional ethic of today's soldier is not meant to release the passions of man in battle as critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army seem to think, but as Aristotle noted, to restrain them. Since the first warrior codes designed to contain the uncontrolled fury of the berserkr, societies have sought to unleash the violence necessary to win wars in a controlled manner that limits collateral damage to innocent and friendly peoples. As described in Dave Grossman's book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, most people seem to have an innate ability to kill. As described in Jonathan Shay's book Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, when a soldier's sense of "what's right" is violated, his character begins to unravel and he is much more likely to revert to the uncontrolled berserkr sort of violence. Such violence is inconsistent with American values and when manifested by soldiers in combat runs counter to American interests. The Code of the Warrior or his professional ethic serves to build character in peacetime and guide action in a time of war, thus helping to counterbalance those aspects of human nature that might naturally lead to uncontrolled violence.
- While there is no official Code of the American Warrior, the current professional ethic (as described in this paper) is about right for the American soldier of the early 21st Century. However, minor adjustments could expand the ethic's utility, making it more applicable at the lower end of the conflict continuum, without detracting from its applicability at the high end. The ethic includes time-tested warrior values, what former Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh and former Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickam called Tier One values. The ethic also includes values and attributes special to the American soldier. Tier One values and attributes include loyalty, courage, selflessness, will and determination to succeed, aggressiveness, daring, initiative, physical fitness, respect, dignity, integrity, and the need to determine a "sense of what's right." Our American heritage has provided the American soldier's sense of duty and refined the sense of "what's right," that is totally consistent with the internationally recognized law of war. Other American values include respect for the rights of

the individual, professionalism, civilian control of the military, compassion, and the concept that soldiering is a privilege that entails special obligations to society. While the American soldier's professional ethic is about right, it could be enhanced by incorporating the value of restraint as practiced by the warriors of the Tao Te Ching.

• With regard to social issues (primarily the integration of women), critics of today's Kinder, Gentler Army identify some areas of concern that the Army should be sensitive to, but not any vulnerabilities that might cause us to lose a future conflict.

While it was beyond the scope of this paper to determine the degree, the integration of women into the Army does seem to have adversely affected training standards and fighting spirit in a significant way. While critics of the "feminization" of the military who confuse abuse and harshness in basic training with being demanding are wrong, there is some evidence that there has been a lowering of individual soldier training standards in basic training. This conclusion is not to denigrate the tremendous contributions of female soldiers whose proud service has proven they are indispensable to the Army. On the contrary, there can be no greater vote of confidence for women than to demonstrate through policy that the Army's deeds match its words with regard to equal opportunity. Proposals such as gender neutral strength testing for each job specialty open to women provide the means for women to serve up to their full potential without resorting to relative as opposed to absolute performance standards.

This paper recommends gender neutral testing for all specialties open to women. It should not be inferred from this recommendation that the author also recommends opening combat positions to women. It is beyond the scope and capacity of this paper to make any informed judgements regarding the proper role of women in combat or other social issues. Yet, as America enters the 21st Century, she must be careful not fall victim to one of the lessons of the chivalrous warrior by putting the means of a gender blind force before ends of success in combat. The environment in which the Army does its work is one of absolute standards imposed by an uncompromising enemy who will take every advantage to defeat us. We must not make the mistake of giving this 21st Century *berserkr* any sort of advantage by allowing social issues to contribute to a lowering of training standards or the cohesion of our combat forces. However, it is a conclusion of this paper that even though the American soldier's professional ethic or code is fine, the warrior spirit may be eroding a bit. The impact is that while Americans can fight and will defeat the 21st Century berserkr on the battlefield, the first battles might be bloodier than they need be.

• While of vital importance, Army efforts to build character through values and Consideration of Others training has failed to resonate through the force. Character training must continue, but it must change. For the most part, junior leaders, and therefore soldiers, consider the Army's Consideration of Others training a "politically correct" response to political pressure brought about after a series of high visibility scandals. In order to prepare soldiers to fight the 21st Century *berserkr* who, the Army must continue character building, but in a way that clearly articulates the relationship between the Army values of dignity, respect and compassion to the warrior code. Soldiers must be taught how they might apply these values in morally ambiguous situations where innocent people are likely to get killed.

Critics that think the Kinder, Gentler Army will not win America's future wars are wrong. As GEN (R) Kroesen predicted in his article "Bum Rap," the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrated how quickly the American soldier can adapt to an enemy with different values. Values training that prepares American soldiers for combat against the 21st Century *berserkr* might, in some circumstances, make the next first battle less costly by desensitizing soldiers and preparing them to quickly, appropriately and ethically return fire in situations where it is kill or be killed. Such character development must be incorporated throughout the training schedule including field exercises, not simply conducted in a classroom.

Mogadishu was one battle, not a prolonged conflict. Perhaps an even bigger benefit to values training that is directly associated with the warrior code would be to help our soldiers preserve their sense of "what's right" after prolonged exposure to combat. Assuming the psychologists Grossman and Shay are correct in their analysis, perhaps the firing rates experienced in Vietnam can be sustained while reducing the number of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) cases.

• Critics of the Kinder, Gentler Army are wrong to conclude the nature of the warrior code is such that soldier's can be prepared to either fight wars or participate in operations short of war, but not both. By implementing aspects of the code of the Taoist warrior and applying lessons from our law enforcement agencies, all soldiers and not just Special Operations or "exceptional" soldiers can be taught a graduated response application of force that would serve them well across the conflict continuum. There is a failure of logic to the "flip a switch" critics' argument that soldiers require a distinctly different mindset for combat and operations short of war. From a high intensity combat perspective, the law of war still requires the soldier to show restraint on the battlefield through the principles of necessity and proportionality. Every war American soldiers have fought has provided plenty of

morally ambiguous situations requiring soldiers to make value judgements regarding the application of lethal force. Only the *berserkr*, to use Stephanie Gutmann's phrase, "morph's into Sergeant Fury" and destroys everything within his reach. On the other hand, in many operations short of war such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, it is ultimately the soldier's ability, readiness, and willingness to apply lethal force that provides the credibility to keep peace. The soldier must show restraint across the conflict continuum and he must be able to apply lethal force across the continuum.

Once one understands that the object of war is to impose will, using deadly force if necessary but not as an end in itself, it is possible to understand that one mindset can guide the soldier in operations throughout the conflict spectrum. Applicable in war and peace, the Taoist warrior's reluctant willingness to use overwhelming force when necessary is a good model for today's soldier to study. An application of the principles of restraint incorporated in the code of the Taoist warrior can be seen in law enforcement agencies that train new recruits from day one to apply an escalating/de-escalating application of force based on the perceived threat.

Utilizing a graduated response would allow for an adjustable "sliding scale" application of force based on a changing threat. Soldiers would need to be taught how to recognize the level of threat they are facing, just as law enforcement officers are so they could apply the right degree of force. Additionally, the Army should develop and provide soldiers increasing numbers of non-lethal weapons in order to provide a greater range of force options so as to avoid situations where a rapid escalation of violence spins a situation and conceivably a national level mission out of control.

• Finally, those who argue that American values should change to match the 21st Century berserkr's lack of values, or that soldier's should not be held accountable for their actions in combat are wrong. As Lieutenant General Sir James Glover articulates, it is all the more essential to maintain values in counterinsurgency or other operations short of war. Soldiers must avoid any urge to employ utilitarian rationalization to justify inappropriate acts. It is necessary for practical reasons such as preventing the escalation of violence or the strengthening of the enemy's resistance. It is also important because using unethical means would undermine the moral imperative for action and thus the legitimacy of the mission. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer states the case well, and also points out that experience shows that even in the heat of battle, soldiers seem to intuitively know when the killing must rightly stop. Certainly every case needs to be examined on its own merits and appropriate consideration made of all the circumstances surrounding whatever action is under

review. It must be remembered that the authors of the Geneva and Hague Conventions understood the moral ambiguity of war and nonetheless were able to reach agreement across a wide number of cultures on broad international laws governing military necessary and proportional use of force. In the final analysis, to be consistent with our beliefs and avoid violating the national sense of "what's right," the soldier must be held accountable for atrocities.

Our Army is in good shape. The professional ethic or Code of the American Warrior is good, solid and about right. The sky is not falling and the American soldier will defeat the *berserkr* warriors on the next battlefield as he has defeated all the other warriors he has faced since 1775.

WORD COUNT = 29,521

APPENDIX 1, ATHENIAN OATH

I will not disgrace my sacred arms Nor desert my comrades, wherever I am stationed. I will fight for things sacred And things profane. And both alone and with all to help me I will transmit my fatherland not diminished But greater and better than before. I will obey the ruling magistrates Who rule reasonably And I will observe the established laws And whatever laws in the future May be reasonably established If any person seeks to overturn the laws Both alone and with all to help me I will oppose him. I will honor the religion of my fathers I call to witness the gods... The borders of my fatherland The wheat, the barley, the vines And the trees of the olive and the fig.

APPENDIX 2, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

Holy Bible, Exodus 20:1-17

- 1 And God spake all these words saying,
- 2 I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.
 - 3 Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
- 4 Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth:
- 5 Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me;
- 6 And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.
- 7 Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.
 - 8 Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
 - 9 Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work:
- 10 But on the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy manservant, nor thy maidservent, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates:
- 11 For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath day, and hallowed it.
- 12 Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.
 - 13 Thou shalt not kill.
 - 14 Thou shalt not commit adultry.
 - 15 Thou shalt not steal.
 - 16 Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.
- 17 Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservent, nor his maidservent, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's.

APPENDIX 3, ARMY VALUES AND ATTRIBUTES

FM 22-100

VALUES

LEADER ATTRIBUTES

Loyalty

Duty

Respect

Selfless Service

Honor

Integrity

Personal Courage

Mental Attributes

- Will

- Self-Discipline

- Initiative

- Judgment

- Self-Confidence

- Intelligence

- Cultural Awareness

Physical Attributes

- Health Fitness
- Physical Fitness
- Military and Professional Bearing

Emotional Attributes

- Self-Control
- Balance
- Stability

APPENDIX 4, U.S. ARMY SOLDIER'S CODE

Army Values Card

- I am an American soldier a protector of our greatest nation on earth sworn to uphold the Constitution of the United States.
- II. I will treat others with dignity and respect and expect others to do the same.
- III. I will honor my Country, the Army, my unit and my fellow soldiers by living the Army values.
- IV. No matter what situation I am in, I will never do anything for pleasure, profit, or personal safety which will disgrace my uniform, my unit or my country.
- V. Lastly, I am proud of my Country and its flag. I want to look back and say that I am proud to have served my country as a soldier.

APPENDIX 5, ARMY ETHOS

FM 100-1

Duty

Integrity

Selfless Service

Core Professional Qualities of:

- Commitment
- Competence
- Candor
- Compassion
- Courage

APPENDIX 6, THE RANGER CREED

Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and "esprit de corps" of my Ranger Battalion.

Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move farther, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be. One hundred-percent and them some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, my neatness of dress and care for equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor.

RANGERS LEAD THE WAY

APPENDIX 7, CREED OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

No one is more professional than I. I am a Noncommissioned Officer, a leader of soldiers. As a Noncommissioned Officer, I realize that I am a member of a time honored corps, which is known as "The Backbone of the Army."

I am proud of the Corps of Noncommissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the Military Service and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

Competence is my watchword. My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind – accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers. I will strive to remain tactically and technically proficient. I am aware of my role as a Noncommissioned Officer. I will fulfill my responsibilities inherent in that role. All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my soldiers and I will always place their needs above my own. I will communicate consistently with my soldiers and never leave them uninformed. I will be fair and impartial when recommending both rewards and punishment.

Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine. I will earn their respect and confidence as well as that of my soldiers. I will be loyal to those with whom I serve; seniors, peers, and subordinates alike. I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage. I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!

APPENDIX 8, CODE OF CONDUCT

Presidential Executive Order and AR 350-30

- 1. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
- 2. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.
- 3. If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
- 4. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
- 5. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
- I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

APPENDIX 9, SPECIAL FORCES CREED AND CORE VALUES

I am an American Special Forces soldier. A professional! I will do all that my nation requires of me.

I am a volunteer, knowing well the hazards of my profession.

I serve with the memory of those who have gone before me: Roger's Rangers, Francis Marion, Mosby's Rangers, the first Special Service Forces and Ranger Battalions of World War II, the Airborne Ranger Companies of Korea. I pledge to uphold the honor and integrity of all I am — in all I do.

I am a professional soldier. I will teach and fight wherever my nation requires. I will strive always, to excel in every art and artifice of war.

I know that I will be called upon to perform tasks in isolation, far from familiar faces and voices, with the help and guidance of my God.

I will keep my mind and body clean, alert and strong, for this is my debt to those who depend upon me.

I will not fail those with whom I serve. I will not bring shame upon myself or the forces.

I will maintain myself, my arms, and my equipment in an immaculate state as befits a Special Forces soldier.

I will never surrender though I be the last. If I am taken, I pray that I may have the strength to spit upon my enemy.

My goal is to succeed in any mission - and live to succeed again.

I am a member of my nation's chosen soldiery. God grant that I may not be found wanting, that I will not fail this sacred trust.

Special Forces Core Values:

Warrior Ethos

Professionalism

Innovation

Versatility

Cohesion

Character

Cultural Awareness

APPENDIX 10, AN AMERICAN SOLDIER'S CREED

III Corps Commander's Handbook, April 1984 edition

I AM AN AMERICAN SOLDIER
I PROUDLY SERVE MY COUNTRY
IN A NOBLE CAUSE. I AM
PREPARED TO GIVE MY LIFE
TO KEEP OUR NATION FREE.
I WILL KEEP MYSELF FIT TO
PERFORM MY DUTY AND CAN
BE TRUSTED TO DO MY BEST.
OTHER SOLDIERS CAN DEPEND
ON ME, AND I WILL FOLLOW
MY LEADERS FAITHFULLY. IN
BATTLE, I WILL NEVER FALTER.
BRAVE SOLDIERS OF THE PAST
WOULD BE PROUD OF ME.
I AM AN AMERICAN SOLDIER.

APPENDIX 10, TRADITIONAL ETHIC OF THE AMERICAN MILIATRY

Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making

Professional soldiers:

- Accept service to country as their watchword and defense of the Constitution of the United States as their calling.
- 2. Place their duty first. They subordinate their personal interests to the requirements of their professional function.
- 3. Conduct themselves at all times as persons of honor whose integrity, loyalty and courage are exemplary. Such qualities are essential on the battlefield if a military organization is to function effectively.
- Develop and maintain the highest possible level of professional knowledge and skill. To do less is to fail to meet their obligations to the country, the profession, and fellow soldiers.
- 5. Take full responsibility for the manner in which their orders are carried out.
- 6. Promote and safeguard, within the context of mission accomplishment, the welfare of their subordinates as persons, not merely as soldiers.
- 7. Conform strictly to the principle that subordinates the military to civilian authority. They do not involve themselves or their subordinates in domestic politics beyond the exercise of basic civil rights.
- 8. Adhere to the laws of war and the regulations of their service in performing their professional functions.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ United States Army Military District of Washington, *Consideration of Others* (Washington, D.C.: Government Print Plant, 1997).
- ² General Sir James Glover, "A Soldier and His Conscience," *Parameters*, September 1983, 58.
- ³ Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, August 1999), 2-10.
 - ⁴ FM 22-100, 2-2.
- ⁵ GEN John A. Wickam Jr., *White Paper: Values, the Rock of our Profession* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986), 5.
 - ⁶ FM 22-100, 2-23.
- ⁷ William Morris, ed., *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 450.
 - ⁸ American Heritage Dictionary, 450.
- ⁹ John W. Brinsfield, "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevence," *Parameters*, August 1998, 70.
 - ¹⁰ FM 22-100, 2-21.
- ¹¹ Huntington, Samuel P., *Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 8-11.
- ¹² Anthony E. Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1989), 27.
 - ¹³ Glover, 54.
 - ¹⁴ Johannes Brondsted, *The Vikings* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1965), 124.
- ¹⁵ Rick Fields, *The Code of the Warrior: In History, Myth, and Everyday Life* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 61.
- ¹⁶ There is debate about which definition is most accurate. The Viking sagas indicate that the berserkr often fought in bear and wolf skins, thinking that while they were wrapped in the skins they would take on character of the beast. Thus, these fanatical warriors who wore the wolf skin were also, less commonly, referred to as *ulfhednar* or wolf skins. Brondstead, 124.
- ¹⁷ Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 77.

- ¹⁸ Shay, 79.
- ¹⁹ Shay, 86.
- ²⁰ One account is a Roman legend about a fight between three Romans, the Horatians, and three Albans. Two of the Horatian brothers and all of the Albans were killed in a ferocious fight. The surviving brother is still in such a rage when he returns home that when he finds his sister weeping for her dead Alban lover, he kills her too. Fields, 64
 - ²¹ Shay, 98.
- ²² Tim Newark, *The Barbarians: Warriors and Wars of the Dark Ages* (Dorset, England: Blandford Press, 1985), 106.
- ²³ Fields, 69. Note: The elite in Alexander the Great's army were known as Peers and Companions. If they were peers, then Alexander was certainly the first among equals, but the term helps reinforce the idea that these warriors truly were companions. They spent leisure time together, eating, drinking and celebrating with the great leader.
- ²⁴ Homer, *The Iliad*. Translated by Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 115.
 - ²⁵ Fields, 69.
 - ²⁶ John Keegan, The Mask of Command (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 35.
 - ²⁷ Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London: The Dial Press, 1974), 126-130.
 - ²⁸ Keegan, 51.
- ²⁹ J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Da Capo Press, 1960), 265.
- ³⁰ Homer, The Iliad, Translated by Andrew Lang, Walter Leaf, and Ernest Myers (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 382.
 - ³¹ Homer, Lombardo trans., 433
 - ³² Fields, 71-72.
 - ³³ Homer, Modern Library, 455.
 - 34 Shay, xiii.
 - ³⁵ Shay, 20.
- ³⁶ MAJ Robert L. MaGinnis, "Character and Leadership," *Infantry Magazine*, September-October, 1987, 9.

- ³⁸ John C. Bahnsen and Robert W. Cone, "Defining the American Warrior Leader," *Parameters*, December 1990, 24-28.
- ³⁹ Field Manual (FM) 100-1, *The Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1994), 9.
- ⁴⁰ William Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I*, in Shakespeare: The Complete Works, Edited by G. B. Harrison (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1948), 606.
 - ⁴¹ MaGinnis, 11.
 - ⁴² Edgar C. Doleman, "Human Values in War." *Army Magazine*. November 1986, 24.
- ⁴³ John Keegan, quoted in William R. Hawkins, "Meeting the Warrior Challenge," *Army Magazine*, January 2001, 14
- ⁴⁴ Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph? (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1999), 32.
 - ⁴⁵ Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, Summer, 1994, 18.
 - ⁴⁶ Glover, 57.
 - ⁴⁷ Winston Churchill quoted in Hawkins, 16.
 - ⁴⁸ Bahnsen & Cone, 24.
 - ⁴⁹ Stephanie Gutmann, *The Kinder, Gentler Military* (New York: Scribner, 2000), 35.
 - ⁵⁰ Brian Mitchell, *Women in the Military* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1998), xiii.
 - ⁵¹ Gutmann, 71.
- ⁵² Gutmann, chapter six, reviews a study done at Natick laboratories to explore possibility of increasing strength of women so they could meet the strength requirements for Military Occupation Specialties that require heavy lifting. The conclusion was that while the athletic potential can be significantly increased beyond current standards, the strongest women are about equal in potential to the weakest men. It must be noted that this was a very limited study, one of the few of its kind, and far from the final answer to questions regarding the athletic potential of women compared to men. Gutmann, 244.
 - ⁵³ Gutmann, 261.
 - ⁵⁴ Gutmann, 244.

³⁷ Wickam, 6.

- ⁵⁵ These studies go back at least as far as the late 1970s. 1981-82 tests showed fewer than 15% of female soldiers qualified for their jobs (Gutmann). A 1976 GAO study had similar results; the both the GAO study and 1978 Evaluation of Women in the Army both recommended gender neutral testing for each MOS. Mitchell, 108-109.
- ⁵⁶ When GEN (R) Edward C. "Shy" Meyer was Army Chief of Staff he wanted to implement gender free standards after the results of a 1981 Women in the Army Policy Review Group. The Army did not implement the policy after strong resistance by the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service and other opponents. Mitchell, Chapter 6.
 - ⁵⁷ Gutmann, 72-73.
 - ⁵⁸ Gutmann, 40.
- ⁵⁹ Madeleine Morris, quoted in Richard Grenier, "A feminist armchair warrior stands down," *National Weekly Edition*, 30 November 1997, 33.
- ⁶⁰ Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 175.
 - ⁶¹ Edgar C. Doleman, "Human Values in War," *Army Magazine*, November 1986, 29.
- ⁶² Field Manual (FM) 27-2, *Your Conduct in Combat* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, November 1984), 14.
- ⁶³ James Harder, "Military Morale Sinks to New Low," *Insight on the News*, 27 November 2000, 19.
 - ⁶⁴ Karl Zinsmeister, "Soldiers of Virtue," *The American Enterprise*, July/August 1994, 4.
- ⁶⁵ Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000), 13-14.
 - ⁶⁶ Zinsmeister, 9.
 - ⁶⁷ Gutmann, 62.
 - ⁶⁸ Gutmann, 72.
- ⁶⁹ Grossman, 180. Note: There is also a third percent of the larger society that are also predisposed to killing. This third percent seem to be psychopathic killers whose actions are beyond the control of military discipline, at least as the U.S. Army thinks of it. It is apparently from this third percent of society that psychopathic and serial killers come from.
 - ⁷⁰ Grossman, 183.
 - ⁷¹ Grossman, 149.
 - ⁷² Grossman, 181.

- ⁷³ Grossman, 253.
- ⁷⁴ GEN Frederick Kroesen, "Bum Rap," *Army Magazine*, November 1991, 27.
- ⁷⁵ Arnold Freedman, "In Defense of the Infantry," *Army Magazine*, November 1990, 10.
- ⁷⁶ William R. Hawkins, "Meeting the Warrior Challenge," *Army Magazine*, January 2001, 14.
- ⁷⁷ Kroesen, 28.
- ⁷⁸ Fields, 166.
- ⁷⁹ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (United States: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 226.
- ⁸⁰ David Wood, "Army Continues Struggle with Combat Ethics," *Army Times*, 9 October 2000, 24.
 - ⁸¹ Fields, 173-178.
 - ⁸² Fields, 178.
- ⁸³ Richard J. Newman, "Can Peacekeepers Make War?," U.S. News & World Report, 19 January 1998, 39.
 - ⁸⁴ Gutmann, 11.
 - 85 Gutmann, 72.
 - ⁸⁶ Newman, 44.
- ⁸⁷Trainin Circular (TC) 27-10-3, Instructor's Guide: The Law of War (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 1985), 24.
- ⁸⁸ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal, ed., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 28.
- ⁸⁹ Andrew J. Bacevich, "New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism," *Parameters*, December 1990, 16.
 - ⁹⁰ Bacevich, 17.
 - 91 Bacevich, 18.
- ⁹² Field Manual (FM) 1 (Prototype Draft, Version K.), *The Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2000), 4.
- ⁹³Vince Crawley, "Shelton: Bush Call to Cut Back Missions Naïve," *Army Times*, 25 December 2000, 24.

- ⁹⁴ COL Harry Summers, "U.S. Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Organizations," *Strategic Review* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, Fall 1993), 70.
- ⁹⁵ Colin Powell, *Colin Powell's Rules*, on 3"X8" card (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 19 March 1993).
 - ⁹⁶ Moskos, Williams & Segal, 1.
 - ⁹⁷ Fields, 99.
 - ⁹⁸ Fields, 100.
 - ⁹⁹ Jane English and Gia-Fu Feng, *Tao Te Ching* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 32.
 - ¹⁰⁰ Fields, 112-113.
- ¹⁰¹ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
 - ¹⁰² Gutmann, 39.
- ¹⁰³ COL (R) John B. Alexander, *Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 14.
 - ¹⁰⁴ Fields, 114.
- ¹⁰⁵ There are pacifist Christian sects that do not believe it is proper, even in a just cause, to use deadly force. However, these groups are on the margins of the Christian faith in this regard and do not represent the Judeo-Christian heritage as a whole.
 - ¹⁰⁶ Alexander, xv.
- ¹⁰⁷ Unknown, *Shoot Not to Kill: Non-Lethal Weapons, Discovery Channel*, 21 November 2000.
- ¹⁰⁸ United States General Accounting Office, *Use of Force: ATF Policy, Training and Review Process Are Comparable to DEA's and FBI's* (Washington, D.C.: Government Print Plant, 29 March 1996), 5.
 - ¹⁰⁹ GAO, 38.
 - ¹¹⁰ GAO, 19.
 - ¹¹¹ GAO, 38.
- The six situations where lethal force may be used are: Self-Defense of others; Assets involving national security; Assets not involving national security but inherently dangerous; serious offenses against persons; arrest or apprehension; escapes. Army Regulation (AR) 190-

- 14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 12 March 1993), 3.
 - ¹¹³ Grossman, 152.
 - ¹¹⁴ Alexander, 182.
- ¹¹⁵ Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, undated but no earlier than 1994), 39.
- ¹¹⁶ Examples of U.S. Marine atrocities at Peleliu and Okinawa can be found in E.B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 120, 123, and 152-153.
 - ¹¹⁷ Shay, 31-32.
 - ¹¹⁸ Grossman, 191.
 - ¹¹⁹ Gutmann, 283.
 - ¹²⁰ Glover, 54.
 - ¹²¹ Wood, 24.
 - ¹²² Glover, 56.
 - ¹²³ Walzer, 306-309.
 - ¹²⁴ Glover, 54.
 - ¹²⁵ Glover, 54.
 - ¹²⁶ MDW Consideration of Others Program.

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